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REEXAMINING THE MASSACHUSETTS 
NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE: IS THE 
"AREAS OF CRITICAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONCERN" PROGRAM AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF 
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY? 
BENJAMIN M. MCGOVERN* 
Abstract: In 1974, the Massachusetts Legislature delegated authority to 
develop statewide policies "regarding the acquisition, protection, and use 
of areas of critical environmental concern" to the Executive Office of 
Environmental Mfairs (EOEA). As of 2003, this power has been parlayed 
into a program that regulates nearly a quarter of a million acres across 
seventy-five Massachusetts municipalities, and in some instances affects 
the vast majority of all land in a particular community. To be certain, 
delegations of legislative power like the one given to EOEA are necessary 
to make government work. It is also possible, however, for these 
delegations to be overbroad, as federal and state non-delegation doctrines 
draw lines in the sand that delegations cannot cross. In Massachusetts, 
one might be tempted to conclude that this limitation no longer exists, 
since the state judiciary has not invalidated a delegation of legislative 
power in thirty years. This Note examines whether the powers given to 
EOEA could reverse this trend, and revive the Massachusetts non-
delegation doctrine. 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 12, 1974, Massachusetts Governor Francis W. Sargent 
signed into law "An Act Establishing an Executive Office of Environ-
mental Affairs" (the Act)} The main purpose of the legislation was to 
centralize previously fragmented environmental regulation power 
into one state agency, the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs 
* Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW 2003-04. 
The author would like to thank his editors, all of whom left this Note in better condition 
than they found it. 
I See Act of Aug. 12, 1974, ch. 806, 1974 Mass. Acts 807-22 (largely codified at MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 21A (2002)). 
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(EOEA).2 In addition to that purpose, it is also significant that the Act 
gave birth to the Massachusetts Areas of Critical Environmental Con-
cern (ACEC) program.3 Specifically, the Act created that program by 
giving EOEA authority to identify Massachusetts lands that should be 
"designated" as ACECs, as well as power to protect those lands by de-
veloping policies that govern ACEC "use."4 While it is impossible to 
know what Massachusetts lawmakers originally intended, some believe 
that the ACEC program has developed into a regulatory sledge-
hammer that the modern EOEA uses to stifle land development in 
the name of environmental protection.5 
Fast forward to December 11, 2002. On that date, EOEA Secre-
tary Robert Durand announced that his office was designating 64,000 
acres of land in north-central Massachusetts as an ACEC.6 With that 
simple pen stroke, Durand placed land from eleven different com-
2 See generally James Ayres, Report Warns of Bay State Environment Crisis, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Nov. 26, 1972, at 71 (stating that the purpose of the proposed legislation was to "eliminate 
overlapping responsibilities of various state agencies and to make state government more 
streamlined, efficient and, ideally, less expensive"); John W. Riley & R.S. Kindleberger, 
Environment: 49 State Agencies Would Be Combined, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 19, 1973, at 3 (ob-
serving that the legislation "would bring 49 units of state government under a single 
agency ... end[ing] duplicated efforts and improv[ing] environmental services"). 
3 See§§ 2(7), 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts at 808, 821. One provision from "An Act Establish-
ing an Executive Office of Environmental Affairs" (the Act) that creates the Areas of Criti-
cal Environmental Concern (ACEC) program is codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.21A, 
§ 2(7) (2002). The other provision from the Act that creates the ACEC program is not 
codified, but is found at section 40(e) of the legislation. § 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts at 821. 
4 Sce§§ 2(7), 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts at 808,821. For a more complete discussion of the 
power delegated to EOEA see infra text accompanying notes 195-203, see also infra note 
197 for a discussion of whether EOEA was actually given affirmative power to designate 
ACECs. 
5 See Anthony Flint, Landowners Take on State Protection Plan Hurting Property Value, Suit 
Says, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 6, 2001, 2001 WL 31230790 (quoting several ACEC landowners 
as saying "environmental-concern designations [ACEC designations] are being used with 
more vigor as a tool to control growth."); Erica Noonan, Environmental Area Ruling Near, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 5, 2002, 2002 WL 101987462 [hereinafter Noonan, EnviTlJ1lmental 
Area] ("The [ACEC] issue, some say, goes beyond an appreciation of the region's natural 
resources. It has turned into a struggle over development rights .... "). Contm Erica 
Noonan, Landowners Riled !Jy Environmentalists' Push Proposal Designates More Than Half of 
Some Towns for Protection, BOSTON GLOBE, June 16, 2002, 2002 WL 4134021 [hereinafter 
Noonan, Landowners] (quoting one proponent as saying that the ACEC Program "is not a 
regulatory sledgehammer ... [it] is not about protecting, but about sustaining the ecology. 
It creates a framework within which different towns can work together for ecological plan-
ning."). 
6 See Erica Noonan, Environmental Activists Elated !Jy State Ruling Some Landowners A.ngered 
!Jy Process, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 15,2002,2002 WL 101989609 [hereinafter Noonan, Activ-
ists]; Erica Noonan, State to Protect 64,000 Acres in 11 Towns Limits Development Northwest of 
Boston, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12, 2002, 2002 WL 101988240. 
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munities into the ACEC program, including 88% of Groton, 71 % of 
Townsend, 61 % of Dunstable, 54% of Pepperell, and just under 50% 
of both Ayer and Shirley.7 By far, Durand's designation was the largest 
in the ACEC program's history, bringing the total amount of land un-
der the program's purview to nearly a quarter of a million acres.8 
One might think that such a designation, affecting so many 
communities and landowners, would be the product of a reasoned 
and intelligent public debate. That is not the case. The process is 
much simpler. In fact, all that is required to begin the designation 
process is nomination of an area for ACEC consideration by any ten 
citizens oj Massachusetts, irrespective of whether those citizens are land-
owners, residents of an affected community, or in any way qualified to 
make such a nomination.9 
Once made, nominations are reviewed by the EOEA Secretary to 
make certain that the area nominated is indeed "eligible" to be desig-
nated as an ACEC.IO The threshold for eligibility, however, is set at a 
fairly low level. To be eligible, an area must contain an environmental 
"attribute" from four out of eleven groups-but these groups are ex-
tremely inclusive.ll For example, environmental "attributes" that help 
satisfy the four-group requirement include swamps, streams, creeks, 
oxbows, lands of agricultural productivity, forestland, natural areas, 
and scenic sites.12 
If the EOEA Secretary finds a nominated area to be eligible, the 
next step in the designation process is a public hearing, though there 
is no requirement that opposition to the nomination be considered in 
good faith. 13 To conclude the process, the EOEA Secretary must ei-
7 See Noonan, Environmental A1'/~a, supra note 5. The other communities affected by this 
designation were Ashby, Harvard, Lancaster, Lunenburg, and Tyngsborough. See id. 
S See id. Approximately seventy percent of ACEC lands have received that designation 
in the years since 1990. See DEP'T OF ENVTL. MGMT., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF ENVTL. AF-
FAIRS, GUIDE TO STATE REGULATIONS & PROGRAMS REGARDING ACECs 16 (2001), available 
at http://www.state.ma.us/dem/programs/acec/regsbooklet.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 
2003). 
9 See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 12.05(1) (a) (2002). Such a nomination may also be 
made by: (1) the Board of Selectmen, City Council, Mayor, Planning Board, or Consen'a-
tion Commission of any city or town affected by the nomination; (2) any state or regional 
planning agency; (3) any member of the Massachusetts General Court; or (4) the Gover-
nor. See id. § 12.05(1)(b)-(d). 
10 [d. § 12.07. 
11 See generally id. § 12.06. 
12 See id. For a complete list of eligibility factors see infra note 283. 
13 See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 12.08. In fact, an attendee characterized one public 
meeting for the December 2002 ACEC designation as a "mutual admiration society" where 
"countless ACEC supporters extoll[ed] the virtues of [the EOEA Secretary] and vice versa, 
lO6 Environmental Affai1"S [Vol. 31:103 
ther accept or reject any nomination within sixty days after the public 
hearing.14 While the EOEA Secretary can consider nine factors when 
making this decision, the "strong" presence of even a single factor is 
enough to support a finding that a nominated area should be desig-
nated as an ACEC.15 
Considering the relative ease with which large swaths of Massa-
chusetts can be designated as ACECs, one might think that the sub-
stantive effects of such a designation would be minimal. Again, that is 
not the case. An ACEC designation has teeth. Individuals wishing to 
develop ACEC-designated land face significant obstacles, found in the 
complex regulatory schemes of three different Massachusetts agen-
cies.16 The most onerous of these obstacles is that any development in 
an ACEC requiring a state permit becomes subject to review under 
the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA)P Functionally, 
this can result in "crippling delay" and additional expense, because 
MEPA review requires developers to submit up to three detailed re-
ports-all at their own expense-that identify a project's environ-
mental impacts, examine the ways that the developer can mitigate 
negative impacts, and suggest alternatives to those impacts.t8 Moreo-
ver, promises made in these reports must be kept before necessary 
state permits can be issued.19 Another potent obstacle to ACEC devel-
opment is the strict prohibition of certain land uses within ACECs.20 
each insisting that the other had done so much more to further the cause." In contrast, 
when an ACEC opponent voiced concerns, the Secretary "sat in quiet conversation with an 
associate." See Joan Simmons, Letter, Environmental Official Appeared Close to One Side, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Dec. 22, 2002, 2002 WL 10199139l. 
14 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 12.10. 
15 See id. § 12.09. Examples offactors that might justify designation include the follow-
ing: uniqueness from a regional perspective; outstanding natural characteristics like rec-
reational opportunities; or richness of wildlife nutrients. See id. 
16 See DEP'T OF ENVTL. MGMT., supra note 8, at 5-15. These three agencies are the 
Office of Coastal Zone Management, Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act Office, and 
Department of Environmental Protection. See id. In addition, the regulatory schemes of 
these three agencies involve at least six different environmental programs administered at 
the state level. See id. 
17 See id. at 7 ("ACECs are addressed in the MEPA regulations at 301 CMR 11.03(11). 
The proponent of any project (as defined by the MEPA regulations) located within an 
ACEC must file an Environmental Notification Form ... unless the project consists solely 
of one single family dwelling. "). 
18 See Doreen M. Zankowski, An Overview of tile Massackusetts Environmental Protection Act 
("MEPA "), CONSTRUCTION OUTLOOK MAG., June 2002. 
19Id. at 3. 
20 See DEP'T OF ENVTL. MGMT., supm note 8, at 9, 15 ("Within an ACEC, potentia.l proj-
ects are prohibited that would result in the loss of up to 5,000 square feet or, in some cases, 
up to 500 square feet, of Bordering Vegetated Wetland ([defined at] 310 CMR 
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The First Circuit has summed up the effect of all this restriction by 
noting that ACEC lands "[are] subject to use restrictions and pre-
sumably a diminution in value. "21 Moreover, Massachusetts agencies 
can make ACEC regulations stricter at any time. In other words, once 
land is designated, its developmen t poten tial is placed under a per-
manent cloud ofuncertainty.22 
At the very least, the Act places substantial power in the hands of 
the EOEA Secretary. Such power is represented by the Secretary's 
ability to craft nomination and designation procedures regarding 
ACECs, as well as by the authority to place land-use restrictions on 
ACECs.23 As a result, the EOEA Secretary can almost unilaterally af-
fect the property rights of Massachusetts landowners.24 
Although true that the ACEC program has existed in this form 
for nearly thirty years, it nonetheless may be vulnerable to attack pre-
cisely because the EOEA Secretary has been delegated such potent 
powers.25 In 1978, a nearly identical program was adjudged to violate 
the Florida Constitution because the legislation creating that program 
delegated to an administrative official "the fundamental legislative 
task of determining which geographic areas and resources are in 
greatest need of protection. "26 Moreover, decisions like this are not 
uncommon-when legislatures attempt to broadly delegate powers to 
third parties or government agencies, they can violate the "nondele-
gation doctrine. "27 This judicial restraint on legislative activity has 
been recognized in various forms by every state and has also been the 
10.55(4)(e» .... [Rlegulations ... prohibit the siting of solid waste management facilities 
within an ACEC."). For a complete discussion of how state environmental agencies regu-
late ACECs, see generally id. at 5-15. 
21 Baker v. Coxe, 230 F.3d 470, 472 (1st Cir. 2000). Contra Noonan, Landowners, supra 
note 5 (noting that development has not slowed in some ACEC areas, and quoting one 
advocate as saying that ACEC regulations are "so nominal that they won't prevent devel-
opment"). 
22 See, e.g., Act of Aug. 12, 1974, ch. 806, §§ 2(7), 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts 807,808,821 
(giving EOEA the power to develop policies regarding the use of ACECs); see also MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch.30A, §§ 2, 5 (2002) (describing procedures for passage of Massachusetts 
administrative regulations); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 12.13 (2002) (outlining the only 
formal procedure available to appeal an ACEC designation). 
23 See§§ 2(7), 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts at 808,821. 
24 See discussion infra Part IILC. 
25 See generally discussion infi'a Part III. 
26 SeeAskewv. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 914-15, 919 (Fla. 1978). 
27 See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the LingeJing Legacy of Antijederalist Separa-
tion oj Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1177 (1999); Gary J. Greco, Survey, 
Standards or Sajeguanis: A Survey oj the Delegation Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 
567,567-68 (1994). 
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subject of successful litigation in federal courtS.28 The fact that this 
doctrine exists, and can invalidate broad delegations of power, begs 
an important question: could a court conclude that the Act violates 
the Massachusetts version of the non delegation doctrine? 
Part I of this Note provides a general synopsis of the nondelega-
tion doctrine, examining its constitutional origins and reviewing gen-
eral application of the doctrine in federal and state courts. Part II of 
this Note explores the specific strain of the nondelegation doctrine 
that has evolved in Massachusetts. Part III of this Note analyzes 
whether Massachusetts courts could use this doctrine to strike down 
the ACEC program and concludes that such a result is conceivable. 
I. DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF THE NON DELEGATION DOCTRINE 
The constitutional doctrine prohibiting delegation of legislative power rests 
on the premise that the Legislature may not abdicate its responsibility to re-
solve the 'truly fundamental issues' by delegating that function to others or 
by failing to provide adequate directions for the implementation of its de-
clared policies. 29 
The basic structure of American government is familiar to most 
citizens. Our constitutions, both federal and state, divide government 
into three branches: legislative, executive, and judicial.30 Equally fa-
miliar is the "separation of powers" corollary: constitutions give each 
of these branches a separate set of powers to utilize and no branch 
may exercise the powers of another.31 
A less familiar notion might be the "nondelegation doctrine" de-
scribed above. Though not explicitly required by any constitution, this 
doctrine represents a logical extension of the separation of powers 
framework. 32 Specifically, if separation of powers means that no 
branch can take away the powers of another branch, then branches 
28 See generally Rossi, supra note 27, at 1189 (comparing and contrasting the fifty state 
nondelegation doctrines and the federal nondelegation doctrine); Greco, supra note 27, at 
568. 
29 .1skew, 372 So.2d at 920-21 (quoting CEEED v. Cal. Coastal Zone Conservation 
Comm'n, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315, 329 (Ct. App. 1974) (citing Kugler v. Yocum, 445 P.2d 303, 
306 (Cal. 1968»). 
30 See generally, e.g., U.S. CON ST. arts. I-III; MASS. CoNST. pmhl. pt. 2, chs. I-III. 
31 See generally, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945-46 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 120-24 (1976); KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW TREATISE § 2.1 (3d ed. 1994). 
32 See generally, e.g., Rossi, supra note 27, at 1177-81, 1185-91; Greco, supra note 27, at 
567-70. 
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cannot give away, or delegate, these same powers.33 In other words, 
since constitutional authors placed powers in specific branches, they 
must have meant for those powers to stay there.34 To accomplish this 
end, separatiQn of powers and the non delegation doctrine work in 
tandem. The former operates to stop aggressive branches from steal-
ing the powers of other branches.35 The latter does the opposite; 
courts employ it in order to prevent branches from delegating their 
constitutionally-assigned powers to other entities.36 
Though simple in theory, the nondelegation doctrine is complex 
in practice, particularly when courts examine delegations of legislative 
power, like the ACEC delegation.37 Because legislatures are responsi-
ble for passing laws dealing with a broad range of topics, they often 
encounter unfamiliar subject matter that is well understood only by 
experts in a particular academic or scientific field. 38 Legislatures cope 
with this problem by drafting difficult statutes in extremely broad 
terms, while delegating the resolution of complicated details to enti-
ties with specialized experience and knowledge.39 If such delegations 
33 See Rossi, sttpra note 27, at 1188-89; Greco, supra note 27, at 568. 
34 See, e.g., Buckley, 424 V.S. at 120. In Buckley, the Supreme Court stated that: 
James Madison ... defended the work of the Framers against the charge that 
these three governmental powers were not entirely separate from one an-
other in the proposed Constitution .... [Madison wrote:] "[t]he reasons on 
which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a further demonstration of his 
meaning. 'When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same 
person or body,' says he, 'there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may 
arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute 
them in a tyrannical manner.' Again: 'Were the power of judging joined with 
the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary 
control, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the ex-
ecutive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor.'" 
[d. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 299 (James Madison) (G.P. Putnam's Sons ed., 
1908». 
35 See generally, e.g., Chadha, 462 V.S. at 945-46; Buckley, 424 V.S. at 120-24. 
36 See generally, e.g., Rossi, supra note 27, at 1177-81, 1185-91; Greco, supra note 27, at 
567-70. 
37 See generally DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 31, § 2.6; Rossi, supra note 27, at 1239-40. 
This Note does not discuss delegations of power attempted by the executive or judicial 
branches. 
38 See, e.g., DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 31, § 2.6 (discussing the various motivations be-
hind delegations of power). 
39 See generally Brodbine v. Inhabitants of Revere, 66 N.E. 607, 609 (Mass. 1903) (hold-
ing that the Legislature had delegated "administration of details which the Legislature 
cannot well determine for itself"); Rossi, supra note 27, at 1179 ("[D]e1egation to agencies 
can assist in reducing the costs of making decisions, including the monitoring and supervi-
sion costs; agencies have institutional advantages over legislatures that make them more 
cost effective."). 
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were not allowed, legislators would be faced with the '''hopeless task 
of writing laws with the requisite specificity to cover endless special 
circumstances across the entire policy landscape,'" and few laws would 
ever get passed.4O 
Unfortunately, the realization that delegation of legislative power 
can be efficient puts competing interests at play. On the one hand, a 
literal application of the nondelegation doctrine seems to indicate that 
any delegation of the law-making authority is impermissible if the sepa-
ration of power principle means anything.41 On the other hand, com-
mon sense indicates that modern legislatures could never function if 
they were unable to delegate some responsibility to specialized adminis-
trative agencies or other experts.42 When weighing these competing 
in terests, courts are not constrained by the nondelegation doctrine as 
they have been with specific constitutional commands, since the non-
delegation doctrine arises only as an implicit extension of the separa-
tion of powers framework.43 As a result, the doctrine is malleable. 
Courts may interpret it as broadly or as narrowly as they choose; leading 
to different conceptions of the nondelegation doctrine across jurisdic-
tions, and varying views on what is the permissible level of legislative 
delegation.44 
A. The Federal Vision of the Nondelegation Doctline 
When Congress delegates power to other actors, federal courts al-
most always accept the delegations as proper, a fact that has led some 
commentators to pronounce the nondelegation doctrine dead at the 
federal leve1.45 There was a time, however, when the federal doctrine 
40 Rossi, supra note 27, at 1183 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967-68 (1983) 
(White,j., dissenting». 
41 See, e.g., Brodbine, 66 N.E. at 608 (noting a general prohibition on delegations of leg-
islative power); Oliver v. Okla. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 359 P.2d 183, 187 (Okla. 
1961). 
42 See, e.g., DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 31, § 2.6. 
48 See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 2.02 (Ist ed. 1958) 
(noting that the "nondelegation doctrine is wholly judge-made"). 
44 Compare Democratic Party of Okla. v. Estep, 652 P.2d 271, 277-78 (Okla. 1982) 
(holding that legislatures must set out policies and articulate definite standards when 
delegating power), with Barry & Barry, Inc. v. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 500 P.2d 540, 
542 (Wash. 1972) (holding that procedural safeguards determine the validity of delega-
tions because "the requirement of specific legislative standards for the delegation of legis-
lative power is excessively harsh and needlessly difficult to fulfill"). 
45 See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 31, § 2.6 ("Except for two 1935 cases, the Court has 
never enforced its frequently announced prohibition on congressional delegation of legis-
lative power."); Rossi, supra note 27, at 1178 ("Since 1935, the Supreme Court has not in-
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had more vitality. In the 1930s, the Supreme Court found on three 
separate occasions that a congressional statute violated the nondelega-
tion doctrine because the statute lacked a "substantive, 'intelligible 
principle' articulated by Congress" that could help courts decide if re-
cipients of delegated powers used them in accordance with legislative 
intent.46 These decisions indicated that federal delegations were per-
missible, but only if detailed standards were included to guide the 
delegation.47 
Over time, the federal judiciary began to articulate a vision of the 
nondelegation doctrine that was less demanding.48 Starting in the 
1940s, the Supreme Court stopped insisting upon the inclusion of de-
tailed standards, and began finding that congressional delegations of 
power were acceptable so long as "general" standards were present.49 
Eventually, the federal judiciary went even further. By the 1960s, the 
focus of nondelegation inquiries had shifted entirely, away from an 
emphasis on statutory standards, and towards an examination of the 
procedural safeguards put in place by the recipients of delegated pow-
ers.50 In other words, the courts no longer relied on statutory stan-
dards to regulate the exercise of delegated powers; rather, they placed 
trust in the recipient's safeguards, hypothesizing that delegated pow-
ers could not be abused if the recipient forced itself to utilize those 
powers responsibly.51 
In recent years, since Congress usually delegates power to adminis-
trative agencies that have extensive procedural safeguards built into 
their structures, federal courts easily find safeguards present, and rarely 
invalidate delegations. 52 Though Justice Rehnquist attempted to revive 
a standards-based interpretation in the 1980s,53 the permissive proce-
validated a single statute on non-delegation grounds."); Greco, supra note 27, at 575-76 
(obsening that Justice Thurgood Marshall viewed the federal doctrine as "abandoned," 
while others believe it to be a "nullity" that "should be reworked"). 
46 Rossi, supra note 27, at 1178 (quoting ].W. Hampton,Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 
U.S. 394, 409 (1928)); see also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311-12 (1936); 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co. 
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935); Greco, supra note 27, at 572-73. 
47 See, e.g., A.L.A. SchechterPoultlY, 295 U.S. at 541-42. 
48 See Rossi, supra note 27, at 1178; Greco, supra note 27, at 574-75. 
49 See Greco, supra note 27, at 574-75. 
50 See Rossi, supra note 27, at 1178. 
51 See id.; see also DAVIS, supra note 43, § 2.15 (hypothesizing that safeguards should 
take the place of statutory standards, because the policy underlying the non delegation 
doctrine can still be served if the recipient of power is forced to protect against "unfairness 
or favoritism"). 
52 See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 31, § 2.6; Greco, supra note 27, at 575-77. 
53 Rossi, supra note 27, at 1180. 
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dural safeguard approach continues to dominate federal jurisprudence 
today.54 
B. The Nondelegation Doctrine at the State Level 
As the preceding section makes clear, the federal nondelegation 
doctrine is little more than an academic curiosity-an outdated legal 
theory that is virtually useless to modern litigants. At the state level, 
however, the "nondelegation doctrine is alive and well," because "state 
supreme courts historically have used the delegation doctrine to a 
greater extent than the U.S. Supreme Court to strike down legislative 
delegations of power. "55 Even so, state nondelegation doctrines are far 
from consistent. Each state judiciary has a particularized interpreta-
tion of their nondelegation doctrine, and some states are far more 
likely to strike down a delegation oflegislative power than others.56 
Despite these global differences, two separate commentators have 
theorized that state non delegation doctrines can be divided into three 
general groups. 57 The first group, the "strict standards and safeguards" 
category, includes approximately twenty states that have articulated the 
strongest possible version of the nondelegation doctrine.58 These states 
54 See id. at 1180-81 ("Although, following Justice Rehnquist's suggestion, some lower 
courts referred to the doctrine as 'no longer ... moribund,' one must search far and wide 
to find lower court opinions striking delegations as unconstitutional."). 
55 Rossi, supra note 27, at 1189; Greco, supra note 27, at 578. Theories abound as to 
why state courts are more apt than their federal counterparts to find legislative delegations 
of power unconstitutional. Some believe that a textual difference between state and fed-
eral constitutions yields the answer. See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 27, at 1188-89. Others hy-
pothesize that federal courts readily permit legislative delegations to the "massive federal 
bureaucracy" because such agencies are considered reliable, while similar delegations to 
state agencies are rejected because those smaller agencies are thought to be less expert, 
and are viewed more skeptically. See Greco, supra note 27, at 578 (citing DANIEL R. MAN-
DELKER ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 599 (2d ed. 1983». 
Some subscribe to the notion that any difference is illusory-the only reason that state 
courts use the non delegation doctrine more frequently to invalidate laws is because, nu-
merically, there are many more state statutes under review than federal statutes. See id. 
56 See Rossi, supra note 27, at 1191; Greco, supra note 27, at 579-80. ' 
57 See Rossi, mpra note 27, at 1191-200; Greco, supra note 27, at 579-80. 
58 See Rossi, supra note 27, at 1193-97 (noting the existence of this category, but label-
ing it "strong nondelegation states"); Greco, supra note 27, at 580-88. Both commentators 
agree that this category contains at least eighteen states: Arizona, Florida, Kentucky, Mas-
sachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, VirgiI)ia, and West Vir-
ginia. See Rossi, supra note 27, at 1191-200; Greco, supra note 27, at 579-80. One commen-
tator, however, believes that the category contains two additional states-Illinois and 
Utah-bringing his total number of states in the category up to twenty. See Rossi, supra 
note 27, at 1196. 
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permit delegations of legislative power only if the statute delegating the 
power "provide[s] definite standards ... or procedures that the [re-
cipient] must adhere to when making a decision. "59 
The second group, the "loose standards and safeguards" cate-
gory, contains nearly half of all states, and favors a more moderate 
view of the nondelegation doctrine.60 Within these states, delegations 
are acceptable if the delegating statute includes a "general legislative 
statemen t of policy," or "a general rule to guide the [recipient] in ex-
ercising the delegated power. "61 
The final group, the "procedural safeguards" category, consists of 
a handful of states, and advocates the weakest nondelegation doc-
trine.62 Largely mirroring current federal doctrine, these states ignore 
statutory standards, and find delegations of legislative power to be 
acceptable so long as recipients of the power have "adequate proce-
dural safeguards" in place.63 
Viewed as a whole, these three groups form a spectrum of non-
delegation interpretation, ranging from aggressive interpretations of 
the doctrine to those that are more restrained.64 Though the groups 
constituting the spectrum appear distinctive, in practical application 
the state doctrines do not fit so easily into one category or another.65 
59 Greco, supra note 27, at 580; see Rossi, supra note 27, at 1193-97. It has been noted 
that this version of the non delegation doctrine roughly corresponds to federal doctrine 
from the 1930s, when that doctrine was at its strongest. Greco, supra note 27, at 580. 
60 See Rossi, supra note 27, at 1198-200 (dubbing the category "moderate nondelega-
tion states"); Greco, supra note 27, at 580. Each commentator agrees that twenty-three 
states belong in this category: Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and 
Wyoming. See Rossi, supra note 27, at 1198-200; Greco, supra note 27, at 588-90. One 
commentator would include Illinois in this category, bringing his total to twenty-four 
states. See Greco, supra note 27, at 588-90. 
61 See Rossi, supra note 27, at 1200; Greco, supra note 27, at 588. This category mirrors 
the federal doctrine of the 1940s, when the Supreme Court required only "general" stan-
dards to make a legislative delegation of power acceptable. See Greco, supra note 27, at 588. 
62 See Rossi, Sltpra note 27, at 1191-93 (naming the category "weak nondelegation 
states"); Greco, supra note 27, at 598-99. It is agreed that six states fit into this category: 
California, Iowa, Maryland, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. See Rossi, Sltpra note 27, 
at 1191-93; Greco, supra note 27, at 598-99. One commentator would include Arkansas, 
raising his total number in the category to seven. See Rossi, supra note 27, at 1201 tbl.l. 
63 Rossi, supra note 27, at 1191-93; Greco, supra note 27, at 598-99. 
64 See Rossi, supra note 27, at 1191-200; Greco, supra note 27, at 579-80. 
65 See Rossi, supra note 27, at 1189, 1239--40 (observing that the application of the 
non delegation doctrine in the states appears to "transcend constitutional text," and that 
the typical state decision "'strings together some misleading legal cliches and announces 
the conclusion'" (quoting DAVIS, supra note 43, § 2.07»; Greco, supra note 27, at 601 ("At 
first glance, [strict standards and safeguards] states appear to adhere to a strict delegation 
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For example, commentators generally agree that the Massachusetts 
non delegation doctrine belongs in the "strict standards and safe-
guards" category-reserved for those states most likely to overturn 
delegations of power.66 Thus, it would seem that legislative delegations 
of power in Massachusetts, like the ACEC delegation, would be sub-
ject to more aggressive judicial review, and therefore vulnerable to 
attack.67 The reality is that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
has not invalidated a legislative delegation of power since 1973, al-
though it has continuously professed that the doctrine retains force as 
ajudicial too1.68 Is the Massachusetts nondelegation doctrine dead? 
II. THE MASSACHUSETTS NON DELEGATION DOCTRINE 
A. Origins in Constitutional Text 
The Massachusetts nondelegation doctrine takes root in a textual 
command from the state constitution that makes separation of powers 
mandatory in state government.69 Specifically, Article 30 of the Massa-
chusetts Declaration of Rights (Article 30) dictates that: 
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative de-
partment shall never exercise the executive and judicial 
powers, or either of them: the executive shall never exercise 
the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the ju-
dicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive pow-
ers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of 
laws and not of men.70 
Thus, unlike the federal constitution and some state constitu-
tions, the Massachusetts Constitution explicitly spells out the separa-
tion of powers requirement; it is impermissible for any branch of gov-
doctrine. Recently, however ... nine out of the eighteen states [within this category] have 
upheld delegations of power to state agencies."). 
66 See Rossi, supra note 27, at 1196; Greco, supra note 27, at 583. 
67 See Act of Aug. 12, 1974, ch. 806, §§ 2(7), 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts 807,808,821; Rossi, 
supra note 27, at 1196; Greco, supra note 27, at 583. 
68 Compare C & S Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. City of Westfield, 766 N.E.2d 63, 67 (Mass. 
2002) ("The principle that the General Court may not delegate the authority to make laws 
is firmly established."), with Corning Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc., 294 N.E.2d 354, 362 
(Mass. 1973) (representing the last Massachusetts decision to strike down a statute on 
non delegation grounds). 
69 See MASS. CON ST. pmbl. pt. 1, art. 30; Constr. Indus. of Mass. v. Comm'r of Labor & 
Indus., 546 N.E.2d 367, 373 (Mass. 1989). 
70 MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 30. 
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ernment to utilize the powers of another.71 Perhaps less obviously, the 
explicit nature of Article 30 also makes it easier for the Massachusetts 
judiciary to extend this separation of powers framework by articulat-
ing a nondelegation doctrine.72 
In fact, Massachusetts courts recognized as early as 1903 that Ar-
ticle 30 provides a constitutional basis for the nondelegation doc-
trine. 73 In Brodbine v. Inhabitants of Revere, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court (SJC) noted that, "[i]t is well established in this com-
monwealth and elsewhere that the Legislature cannot delegate the 
general power to make laws, conferTed upon it by a constitution like that of 
Massachusetts . ... This doctrine is held by the courts almost univer-
sally. "74 Moreover, this idea seems to have survived the passage of 
time, because the current SJC often uses this exact language when 
examining delegations of legislative power.75 In sum, Massachusetts 
courts have had little trouble acknowledging that a nondelegation 
doctrine exists, and that it has a solid basis in the text of the state con-
stitution.76 More troublesome has been the determination of just how 
potent this doctrine should be. 
71 Compare MASS. CON ST. pt. I, art. 30, with U.S. CONST. art. I-III; see also Rossi, supra 
note 27, at 1190 (citing Article 30 as an example of a mandatory separation of powers pro-
vision). It should be noted that the Massachusetts requirement of separation of powers is 
not as burdensome in practice as it appears in rhetoric. See generally Commonwealth v. 
Gonsalves, 739 N.E.2d 1100, 1104-05 (Mass. 2000). In reality, Massachusetts courts have 
opined that constitutional separation of powers does not actually require "watertight" 
compartments of government, and that branches may utilize the powers of another branch 
if doing so would be more efficient. See id.; Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 363 
N.E.2d 652, 658-62 (Mass. 1977). As a rule, when this borrowing occurs, "focus ... is on 
'the essence of what cannot be tolerated under art. 30 ... interference by one department 
with functions of another.'" Gray v. Comm'r of Revenue, 665 N.E.2d 17, 22 (Mass. 1996) 
(quoting Chief Admin. Justice of the Trial Court v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 533 N.E.2d 
1313,1316 (Mass. 1989». 
72 See, e.g., COllstr. Indus. of Mass., 546 N.E.2d at 373; Brodbine v. Inhabitants of Revere, 
66 N.E. 607, 608 (Mass. 1903). 
73 See Brodbine, 66 N.E. at 608. 
74Id. (emphasis added). 
75 See, e.g., C & S Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. City of Westfield, 766 N.E.2d 63, 67 (Mass. 
2002) ("The principle that the General Court may not delegate the authority to make laws 
is firmly established. "); Constr. Indus. of Mass, 546 N.E.2d at 373 ("Article 30 ... provides 
for the strict separation of powers in the government of the Commonwealth. The doctrine 
of separation of powers encompasses the general principle that the Legislature cannot 
delegate the power to make laws."). 
76 See C & S Wholesale Grocers, 766 N.E.2d at 67; Constl: Indus. of Mass., 546 N.E.2d at 
373. 
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B. ATe Some Types of Delegation Pennissible? 
Even as the turn-of-the-century SJC was discovering the nondelega-
tion doctrine, it realized that the Massachusetts Legislature would need 
some ability to delegate authority in order to be functional. 77 In fact, 
even as Brodbine cited the nondelegation doctrine with approval, the 
court actually approved the delegation at issue.78 Brodbine involved mu-
nicipal park commissioners who located and built a boulevard within a 
state park, and passed a resolution forbidding vehicular travel on that 
boulevard.79 Plaintiff, aggrieved by the prohibition, alleged that the 
Massachusetts Legislature had violated the nondelegation doctrine by 
giving municipal boards the power to regulate state parklands.80 
In addressing the allegation, the SJC recognized that Article 30 
supports the idea that the Legislature cannot delegate the power to 
make laws.8! Nevertheless, the court found that the delegation in 
question did not violate Article 30 because there was "strong ground 
for the contention that the ... statute simply leaves to the [Revere] 
board ... administration of details which the Legislature cannot well 
determine for itself .... "82 
Implicitly, the court concluded that it would be inefficient to re-
quire the Legislature to draft detailed regulations for every park in 
the state, so it should be allowed to delegate that responsibility to 
other entities.83 In order to justifY approving such a delegation in the 
face of the "well established" nondelegation doctrine, the court 
sought refuge in the distinction between formulation of legislative 
policy and control over administrative details that carry out such poli-
cies.84 Specifically, the court held that the power to make laws had not 
been delegated because the Revere board was only given authority to 
fill in the gaps of a legislative policy that the Legislature had already 
articulated.85 According to the court, the larger policy was that indi-
viduals violating any pm"k Tegulation should be punished, in order to avoid 
chaos in state parks.86 For the court, the essence of legislative power 
77 See Brodbine, 66 N.E. at 608-09. 
78 See id. 
79 [d. at 608. 
IJ{J [d. 
8\ [d. 
82 [d. at 609. 
83 See Brodbine, 66 N.E. at 609. 
84 See id. at 608-09. 
85 See id. at 609. 
86 See id. 
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was represen ted by that large policy decision, and not by the specific 
park regulation that prohibited vehicular travel.87 
1. Continued Recognition That Some Delegation Is Acceptable 
Thus, through Brodbine, the SJC sent a signal that the nondelega-
tion doctrine existed, but that it would not prohibit every single dele-
gation of legislative power. This principle was expressed more clearly 
in a later decision, when the court stated that "[t]he Legislature may 
delegate ... the working out of the details of a policy adopted by the 
Legislature. "88 Having articulated this bright-line test, in subsequent 
years the court had to distinguish between legislative policymaking 
and the administration of details on many occasions.89 As a general 
matter, the SJC has almost always found these delegations to be per-
missible.9o 
For example, in Commissioner of Revenue v. Massachusetts Mutual 
Life Insurance Co., the SJC examined a statute that gave the Commis-
sioner of Insurance authority to decide what information Massachu-
setts insurance companies were required to include in their annual 
financial statements.91 The plaintiff argued that the contents of an-
nual statements critically affected what portion of their yearly income 
was taxable, and by extension, functionally determined the amount of 
excise tax they owed.92 Thus, the plaintiffs alleged that by giving the 
Commissioner power to control annual statement contents, the Legis-
lattne effectively handed over the power to calculate excise tax bills in 
violation of the nondelegation doctrine.93 The court rejected this ar-
gument, holding that the Commissioner's discretion to alter the con-
tents of annual statements was for the purpose of eliciting a "complete 
and accurate exhibit of the condition and transactions of the compa-
nies," and that any related influence over the amount of tax paid was 
87 See id. 
88 Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 205 N.E.2d 346, 351 
(Mass. 1965). 
89 See, e.g., Town of Warren v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council, 466 N.E.2d 
102,112-13 (Mass. 1984); Comm'r of Revenue v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 428 N.E.2d 297, 
300-01 (Mass. 1981). 
90 See, e.g., C & S Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. City of Westfield, 766 N.E.2d 63, 69 (Mass. 
2002); Tri-Nel Mgmt., Inc. v. Bd. of Health, 741 N.E.2d 37,45 (Mass. 2001). 
91 428 N.E.2d at 300. Generally, delegating to the Commissioner of Insurance the 
authority to classify or not classify income as "gross investment income" for annual state-
ment purposes was the most contentious issue. [d. 
92 [d. 
93 [d. 
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purely incidenta1.94 Moreover, the court emphasized that the Legisla-
ture had itself determined the excise tax rate, and had only delegated 
the authority to determine what portion of yearly income was appli-
cable to that rate.95 The legislative policy was the determination of the tax 
mte applicable to insurance companies, and a detail necessary to carry 
out that policy was the amount of yearly income upon which that rate 
would operate.96 Thus, since the Legislature had made the policy de-
termination and had only delegated the working out of details, the 
court found the delegation constitutiona1.97 
2. A Reminder That the Doctrine Retains Force 
The SJC has concluded-on one occasion-that a legislative 
delegation illegally gave away the power to formulate policy.98 In Corn-
ing Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc., the challenged statute authorized 
product manufacturers to enter into "fair-trade" contracts with retail-
ers that sold their products.99 These contracts mandated that retailers 
could not re-sell the manufacturer's products at a price below the 
"fair-trade" price fixed by the manufacturer. IOO In Corning Glass Works, 
the defendant retailer had never entered into such a contract, but a 
manufacturer nonetheless sought to stop that retailer from selling its 
products below the price established by the manufacturer in other 
"fair-trade" contracts. lOi The retailer argued that the statute violated 
the nondelegation doctrine because it gave the manufacturer power 
94 [d. 
95 [d. at 300-01. 
96 [d. 
97 See Mass. Mut. Life Ins., 428 N.E.2d at 300-01. The SJC has determined in numerous 
other instances that statutes delegated only the working out of details. See, e.g., Town of 
Warren v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council, 466 N.E.2d 102, 112-13 (Mass. 
1984) (upholding a statute that froze local zoning when a developer filed a notice of intent 
to build a hazardous waste facility because the developer'S ability to file a notice of intent 
was a necessary detail of the legislative policy that hazardous waste facilities should be 
more easily sited); Arno v. Alcoholic Beverages Comm'n, 384 N.E.2d 1223, 1226-28 (Mass. 
1979) (upholding a statute that prohibited the granting of liquor licenses within 500 feet 
of an objecting school or church because the right to object to liquor licenses was only a 
detail of the larger policy that liquor should be kept away from concerned schools or 
churches). 
98 See Corning Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc., 294 N .E.2d 354, 362 (Mass. 1973). On 
another occasion, a dissenting opinion found a prospective delegation of legislatiYe 
authority to violate the non delegation doctrine. See Opinion of Justices to Senate, 424 
N.E.2d 1092, 1110-11 (Mass. 1981) (Liacos & Abrams,JJ., dissenting). 
99 294 N .E.2d at 355. 
100 [d. 
101 [d. at 355-56. 
2004] The Massachusetts Nondelegatioll Doctrine 119 
to craft legislative policy, by determining a "fair-trade" price floor that 
would bind all retailers selling that manufacturer's products.102 
The court agreed, holding that "[t]here is no provision [in the 
statute] ... for any policy ... to govern the prices set," and therefore 
the Legislature had not formulated the policy itself, but had improp-
erly delegated it to the manufacturers. 103 Implicitly, the court but-
tressed its conclusion by observing that the determination of a "fair-
trade" price represented something beyond the filling in of details in 
order to carry out a larger policy.104 Rather, that "price-setting" was 
itself a policy judgment, in much the same way that the setting of tax 
rates reflected a judgment about how civic costs should be appor-
tioned in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance CO.I05 In both situations, 
the policy determination represented the essence of the power to 
make laws, and in Corning Glass Works the attempt to delegate that 
power could not help but violate the nondelegation doctrine.106 
c. An Additional Restliction: Protection Against ArbitraJiness 
By insisting that only the Legislature could formulate policy, these 
early court decisions largely eliminated the risk of arbitrary legislative 
policies, because citizens could refuse to reelect those responsible for 
passing arbitrary laws.107 But, since legislative delegation of policy de-
tails was acceptable, arbitrary action concerning those details remained 
a risk. Massachusetts courts knew that unelected recipients of delegated 
powers-like agencies, boards, or private citizens-were largely outside 
the democratic process, and therefore did not face electoral conse-
IOZ Id. at 356. 
103 See id. at 362. Though the statute in question delegated power to an individual and 
not to another government actor, the court placed little emphasis on that distinction. See 
id. ("Delegations of governmental powers to private persons or groups can be no broader 
than that to public boards or officers."). Subsequent decisions agreed that delegations 
should not fail just because power was delegated to outside actors. Town of Arlington v. Bd. 
of Conciliation & Arbitration, 352 N.E.2d 914, 920 (Mass. 1976) ("The delegation does not 
fail in that it was conferred on a 'private person' .... [D 1 elegations to private persons are 
not forbidden so long as proper safeguards are provided."). 
104 See Corning Glass W01*S, 294 N.E.2d at 360 ("The resolution of this dispute involves 
questions of economic theory and political judgment: To what extent is the obvious short-
run interest of the consumer in lower prices offset by a long-ru[nl interest in preserving a 
competitive structure .... Disputes of this type are regularly and properly resolved in the 
political and legislative arenas."). 
105 Compare Comm'r of Revenue v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 428 N.E.2d 297, 300-01 
(Mass. 1981), with Corning Glass Win*s, 294 N.E.2d at 362. 
106 See Corning Glass W01*S, 294 N.E.2d at 362. 
107 See, e.g., Mass. Mut. Life Ins., 428 N.E.2d at 300-01; Corning Glass Works, 294 N.E.2d 
at 362. 
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quences when they arbitrarily exercised power. lOB Recognizing this 
problem, the courts erected obstacles to guard against arbitrariness in 
situations where delegations were otherwise appropriate. 109 
Corning Glass Works was not the first instance where this issue was 
addressed, but the decision is nonetheless instructive. IIO Although the 
SJC ultimately based its holding on other grounds, the court was also 
troubled that the challenged statute contained "no provision for par-
ticipation by any public board or officer in the process by which [the 
manufacturer] fixes the prices ... nor for any policy or standard to 
govern the prices set ... nor for notice, hearing, or judicial review of 
the prices fixed. "111 Essentially, the court seemed to be suggesting an 
alternative reason for its holding. Specifically, the lack of statutory 
standards, lack of provisions for judicial review, and unaccountability 
of the manufacturers involved meant that delegated powers could 
have been used arbitrarily by recipients. 1l2 
The SJC expounded upon these ideas three years later in Town of 
Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & ATbitmtion. ll3 In this case, a statute 
gave a three-arbitrator panel the power to resolve salary disputes be-
tween certain municipal employees and municipalities.1l4 The arbitra-
tion panel had the authority to select either the "last and best" salary 
offer from an employee organization, or from an employer town, as 
being more reasonable. 1l5 That decision would then become binding 
upon both parties.1l6 Plaintiffs alleged that the statute violated the 
nondelegation doctrine because it gave the panel the power to decide 
the proper level of compensation for municipal employees, and im-
pose that judgment upon both parties.1l7 
108 See Corning Glass Works, 294 N.E.2d at 362. 
109 See id. 
110 See id. The need to guard against abuse with standards and safeguards had been 
discussed in some prior cases. See, e.g., Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. Boston Safe Deposit & 
Trust Co., 205 N.E.2d 346, 351 (Mass. 1965). 
III Corning Glass W01*S, 294 N.E.2d at 362. 
112 See id. 
113 See 352 N.E.2d 914, 920 (Mass. 1976). 
114 See id. at 917 n.3. The three-member arbitration panel consisted of an arbitrator se-
lected by the municipality, an arbitrator selected by the employee organization, and an 
impartial arbitrator selected by the other two arbitrators. Id. 
1\5Id. at 917. 
116Id. at 917 n.3. This authority also depended upon the fulfillment of other statutory 
requirements having to do with notice, good faith, and exhaustion of remedies. See id. 
117 See id. at 919. 
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The court held that the statute did not violate the non delegation 
doctrine. l1B It presumed that the statute delegated to the panel the 
filling in of details, rather than a substantive policy determination.119 
More importantly, the court determined that the statute provided ade-
quate safeguards that would prevent the panel from abusing the power 
that it had been delegated. 120 Stating that "we are [concerned] with 
'the totality of the protection against arbitrariness' provided in the 
statutory scheme," the court overtly acknowledged that abuses of dis-
cretion needed to be controlled, even if the delegation was otherwise 
appropriate. 121 Applying that standard to the facts, the court found that 
the board "must follow detailed procedures and is bound to apply [ten] 
statutory standards in reaching a decision."122 The court concluded 
that "the safeguards against arbitrary action in this statute are extensive, 
and they provide the act with a sound constitutional basis."123 
D. Putting It All Together: Three Nondelegation Inqui1ies 
In reviewing these early nondelegation decisions, one can sense 
that the SJC knew some delegations of legislative authority were un-
constitutional, but often had difficulty adhering to a consistent ap-
proach.124 Often, the court focused on the essence of what had been 
delegated-was it the power to make policy, or the authority to fill in 
details?125 At other times, the court sped through that analysis, and 
IlB See id. at 920. 
Il9 Sec Bd. of Conciliatio1l & Arbitration, 352 N.E.2d at 919-20. Perhaps the court viewed 
the real policy decision as the determination that labor impasses involving police and fire 
departments should be resolved quickly. See id. By extension, the actual selection of one 
"last and best" offer would only represent a detail that was necessary to carry out that 
larger policy. See id. But, one could argue that the selection of one salary offer over an-
other could not help but represent a policy judgment about the proper level of compensa-
tion emergency officials should receive, involving intangible factors like the difficulty of 
the job, and the importance of the services rendered. See id. In this sense, the power dele-
gated here is arguably like the determination of a tax rate, or the setting of a "fair-trade" 
price, that other decisions have classified as policy-based. Cj Comm'r of Revenue v. Mass. 
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 428 N.E.2d 297, 300-01 (Mass. 1981); Corning Glass Works v. Ann & 
Hope, Inc., 294 N.E.2d 354, 362 (Mass. 1973). 
120 See Bd. Of Conciliation & Arbitration, 352 N.E.2d at 920. 
121 Id. (quoting KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.00-5 
(Supp.1970». 
122 Id. The ten standards consisted of a list of "factors ... to be given weight by the ar-
bitration panel in arriving at a decision." Id. at 919 n.5. 
123 Id. at 920. 
124 Compare Comm'r of Revenue v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 428 N.E.2d 297, 300-01 
(Mass. 1981), with Bd. of Conciliation & Al'bitration, 352 N.E.2d at 919-21. 
125 Sec, e.g., Mass. Mitt. Life Ins., 428 N.E.2d at 300-01. 
122 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 31:103 
instead scrutinized the protection against arbitrariness that a given 
statutory scheme provided.126 In 1984, the SJC went a long way to-
wards solving this problem by clearly articulating three inquiries to be 
employed by courts when reviewing delegations of legislative power.127 
In Chelmsford Tmiler Park, the court recognized the ambiguity sur-
rounding the nondelegation doctrine, and attempted to clarifY it.128 
The SJC stated that: 
No formula exists for determining whether a delegation of 
legislative authority is "proper" or not. Here, in order to 
make that determination, we undertake a threefold analysis: 
(1) [d]id the Legislature delegate the making of fundamen-
tal policy decisions, rather than just the implementation of 
legislatively determined policy; (2) does the act provide ade-
quate direction for implementation, either in the form of 
statutory standards or, if the local authority is to develop the 
standards, sufficient guidance to enable it to do so; and (3) 
does the act provide safeguards such that abuses of discre-
tion can be controlled?l29 
Mter articulating these inquiries, the court proceeded to the merits of 
the case, and decided that the statute in question was not an unconsti-
tutional delegation of power.130 
The Chelmsfonl case involved a statute giving individual munici-
palities power to control rent levels and evictions within mobile home 
parks.131 It was not disputed that the statute delegated only details 
concerning an already-stated policy-namely, that a local response 
was needed to address erratic evictions and unreasonable rents being 
imposed by local mobile park owners.132 Thus, the first inquiry of the 
newly announced test was easily answered in the negative.I33 The 
126 See, e.g., Bd. of Conciliation & ArlJitmtion, 352 N.E.2d at 919-21. 
127 See Chelmsford Trailer Park, Inc. v. Town of Chelmsford, 469 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 
(Mass. 1984). 
128 See id. 
129 Id. 
130 See id. at 1263-65. 
\31 Id. at 1260. 
132 See id. at 1261-62 (discussing the policy and purpose behind the statute, but identi-
fying the "main thrust of the owner's argument" as having to do with a lack of standards in 
the statute). 
133 See Chelmsford Trailer Park, 469 N.E.2d at 1261-64 (largely skipping the first inquiry 
because the plaintiff's argument implicated only the second and third inquiries). A "nega-
tive answer" to the first Chelmsford inquiry is another way of saying that only control over 
the details of an already-stated policy had been delegated. See id. at 1262. 
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more contentious allegation was the second inquiry of the new test, 
namely that the statute "fail [ed] to delineate sufficiently specific 
guidelines, standards, and procedures for the application of the by-
law by the [Chelmsford] board."134 
Although the court acknowledged that the statute in question was 
less detailed than other rent control laws, it indicated a willingness to 
evaluate the statute broadly, stating that "[p]rovided that the policy and 
purpose of the Legislature are clearly expressed, the absence of de-
tailed standards in the legislation itself will not necessarily render it in-
valid."135 Continuing, the court observed that '''the standards for action 
to carry out a declared legislative policy may be found not only in the 
express provisions of an act but also in its necessary implications. The 
purpose, to a substantial degree, sets the standards. "'136 
The court then interpreted the statute as sufficiently restraining 
the town's discretion. 137 First, the court inferred standards from the 
statute's purpose that prevented the town from establishing irrational 
rent levels.138 Though no specific standards in the statute addressed 
rent levels, a stated purpose of the statute was that "whatever adjust-
ments are made must assure that the [trailer home park] owner will 
receive a 'fair net operating income. "'139 Thus, the town was guided by 
an implicit standard because it could not impose a rent ceiling that 
would deny mobile home park owners a "fair net operating income."140 
Next, the court determined that eviction standards from other sections 
of the Massachusetts Code could stand in for eviction standards missing 
from the statute in question)41 The S1C observed that '" [i]ndividual 
134 Id. at 1262. In its analysis, the court explicitly alluded to third-inquiry safeguards 
only once, when it stated that the act "provides ... sufficient safeguards to protect against 
arbitrary action or abuse of discretion." See id. In large part, the court seemed to assume 
that if it could find sufficient standards to satisfy the second inquiry, the safeguards re-
quired by the third inquiry would also be present. See id. at 1262-64 ("This act, coupled 
with the availability of judicial review and the clearly expressed objectives of the act, pro-
vides sufficient protection to the owner and to the other tenants against the arbitrary 
granting of rent decreases."). 
135 Id. at 1262. 
136 Id. (quoting Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 205 N.E.2d 
346,351 (Mass. 1965». 
137 See id. at 1262-64. 
138 See id. at 1264. 
139 Chelmsford Trailer Park, 469 N.E.2d at 1264. "Fair net operating income" was defined 
as income after expenses which yields a return on the fair market value of the property 
equal to the generally available debt service rate or such other rates as the board deems 
appropriate. Id. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. at 1263. 
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statutory provisions related to the same general area must be read 'as a 
whole ... to the end that ... the [entire legislative program] will con-
stitute a consistent and harmonious whole.""142 Applying that logic, the 
court found that although the challenged statute did not explicitly tell 
the town when eviction was appropriate, such direction could be found 
from other state statutes dealing with mobile home evictions in slightly 
different contexts}43 
Thus, when answering the second inquiry, the SJC inferred stan-
dards that were otherwise lacking, and concluded that the statute did 
not violate the non delegation doctrine.144 Ultimately, Chelmsford Trailer 
Park is most significant for its articulation of three nondelegation in-
quiries. Yet, the actual holding is also critical, because the SJC dis-
played a willingness to answer these inquiries loosely, an inclination 
that would continue to manifest itself in later decisions}45 
E. Recent Developments: The SJC Applies the Chelmsford Inquiries 
In the years since Chelmsford Trailer Park, the SJC has not found any 
delegation of legislative power to be unconstitutional.146 In most in-
stances where a delegation dispute reached the SJC, the court pro-
ceeded quickly through the Cheilnsfonl inquiries, finding easy answers to 
all three questions.147 For example, in Powers v. Secretary of Administration 
the Massachusetts Legislature reacted to a fiscal crisis in the city of 
Chelsea by passing a statute establishing a "receivership."148 In essence, 
the "receivership" suspended most Chelsea government powers for one 
year, and vested these powers in a "receiver" appointed by the Gover-
142 [d. (quoting Jones v. Town of Wayland, 402 N.E.2d 63,68-69 (Mass. 1980) (quoting 
Haines v. Town Manager, 68 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Mass. 1946) ». 
143 [d. 
144 [d. at 1262-64. 
145 See Chelmsford Trailer Park, 469 N.E.2d at 1262-64; see also Risk Mgmt. Found. v. 
Comm'r ofIns., 554 N.E.2d 843, 847-48 (Mass. 1990). 
146 See generally, e.g., C & S Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. City of Westfield, 766 N.E.2d 63 
(Mass. 2002); Tri-Nel Mgmt., Inc. v. Bd. of Health, 741 N.E.2d 37 (Mass. 2001); Opinions 
of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 696 N.E.2d 502 (Mass. 1998) lOps. Justices 
H.R.]; Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 660 N.E.2d 652 (Mass. 1996) [Op.Justices S.]; 
Powers v. Sec'y of Admin., 587 N.E.2d 744 (Mass. 1992); Risk Mglllt. Found., 554 N.E.2d 843; 
Constr. Indus. of Mass. v. Comm'r of Labor & Indus., 546 N.E.2d 367 (Mass. 1989); Blue 
Cross of Mass., Inc. v. Comm'r of Ins., 489 N.E.2d 1249 (Mass. 1986); Opinion of the Jus-
tices to the House of Representatives, 471 N.E.2d 1266 (Mass. 1984) (finding delegations, 
or prospective delegations, to pass nondelegation scrutiny) [Op.Justices H.R.]. 
147 See, e.g., C & S Wholesale Grocers, 766 N.E.2d at 68; Tn-Nel Mglllt., 741 N.E.2d at 44-
45; Op. justices H.R., 696 N.E.2d at 507-08; Powers, 587 N.E.2d. at 748-50. 
148 Powm, 587 N.E.2d at 745. 
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nor, who was charged with devising a long-term solution to the city's 
fiscal problems.149 It was alleged that the statute violated the nondele-
gation doctrine because the Legislature's power to deal with Chelsea's 
fiscal crisis had been delegated to the "receiver. "150 
The SJC addressed the Chelmsford inquiries one by one. In an-
swering the first inquiry, the court found that the Legislature had 
delegated only the power to oversee details, and had not given away 
the authority to formulate policy.151 Specifically, the legislative branch 
had "set forth the fundamental policy decision [] that the financial 
situation of Chelsea is intolerable and should be improved through 
the imposition of a receivership," the "receivership" duties themselves 
being only details. 152 Moving on, the SJC found the second inquiry 
satisfied because the "Legislature has set forth adequate direction for 
the receiver's implementation" through enumerated powers and clear 
objectives that provided "direction as to the manner in which the re-
ceiver shall implement ... the ... policy decision to improve Chel-
sea's financial position. "153 Finally, the court found that the third in-
quiry was satisfied, because the statute as a whole "provides safeguards 
to control any abuses of the receiver's discretion."154 Such safeguards 
included: (1) an annual report the "receiver" was required to submit 
to the Legislature; (2) Secretary of Administration approval for cer-
tain "receiver" actions; and (3) the fact that the one-year term of the 
"receiver" could be terminated at any time for just cause.155 Most SJC 
non delegation decisions have looked like Powers-the SJC answered 
each Chelmsford inquiry in turn, and found a delegation to be permis-
sible.156 But, when the court has been unable to find supportive an-
swers for all three inquiries, the SJC has followed the trend started in 
149 See id. 
150 See id. at 748. 
151 [d. at 749. 
152 [d. 
153 [d. Examples of these powers and objectives included specific directives that the 
"receiver" establish: (1) an annual balanced budget; (2) a five-year operating and capital 
outlay plan; (3) school and government budgets; (4) uniform budget guidelines; (5) uni-
form financial planning systems; (6) a "city recovery" plan; and (7) prudent financial 
management techniques. See id. 
154 Powers, 587 N.E.2d at 750. 
155 [d. 
156 See, e.g., C & S Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. City of Westfield, 766 N.E.2d 63, 67-68 
(Mass. 2002). 
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Chelmsford Tmiler Park by affording a challenged statute considerable 
latitude. 157 
For example, in Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Commissioner of 
Insumnce, the SJC found a delegation of power to be constitutional, 
even though it was not clear that the third Chelmsford inquiry could be 
answered satisfactorily.158 The challenged statute gave the Massachu-
setts Commissioner of Insurance the power to review statewide insur-
ance company rate increases.159 Before the Commissioner could ap-
prove any rate increase, however, the statute required a finding that the 
relevant insurance company "'employ[s] a utilization review program 
and other techniques acceptable to [the Commissioner] which have ... 
a demonstrated impact on the prevention of reimbursement by such 
corporation[s] for services which are not medically necessary."'I60 
Plaintiffs alleged that the statute delegated unfettered power to reject 
rate increases because the Commissioner could always claim that a 
company's utilization review program was not "acceptable to him. "161 
Not presented with the question of whether the statute delegated 
policymaking powers, the court's analysis focused on the subject matter 
of the second and third Chelmsford inquiries.162 Recognizing tha t de-
tailed standards to govern what the Commissioner should find "to be 
acceptable to him" could not be found in the statute, the court held 
that "[e]ven 'very general [legislative] guides'" could replace specific 
standards if the overall scheme was subject to judicial review,163 Then, 
without discussing whether such judicial review was available, the court 
held that certain "general guides" allowed the statute to pass nondele-
gation scrutiny. 1M Specifically, the SJC found "general guides" to be 
157 See Tri-Nel Mgmt., Inc. v. Bd. of Health, 741 N.E.2d 37, 44-45 (Mass. 2001); Blue 
Cross of Mass., Inc. v. Comm'r ofIns., 489 N.E.2d 1249, 1255-56 (Mass. 1986); Chelmsford 
Trailer Park, Inc. v. Town of Chelmsford, 469 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Mass. 1984). 
158 See 489 N.E.2d at 1256. It should be noted that although Blue Cl'OSS of Massachusetts, 
Inc. was decided after Chelmsford Trailer Park, the Blue Cl'OSS court did not explicitly ac-
knowledge the Chelmsford inquiries in its holding. See id. at 1255-56. 
159 [d. at 1250-51. 
160 Id. at 1255 n.12 (quoting Act of July 12, 1984, ch. 199, §§ 2, 5-6, 1984 Mass. Acts 
316,317-19). 
161 [d. at 1255. 
162 See id. at 1255-56. Again, the Blue Cl'OSS court dealt with subject matter covered by 
these Chelmsford inquiries, but did not explicitly reference the inquiries. See id. 
163 [d. at 1256 (quoting Corning Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc., 294 N.E.2d 354, 361 
(Mass. 1973». 
164 Blue Cl'OSS of Mass., 489 N.E.2d at 1256. There were undoubtedly formal judicial 
safeguards in place that could have protected those who may have been aggrieved by the 
Commissioner's decisions, such as the normal judicial review of administrative decisions. 
Yet, the court did not mention any such safeguards in its analysis, and did not seem to 
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present because the Commissioner's determination of what was "ap-
propriate to him" would occur only after a review of existing programs 
already in place, and would not include the power to force companies to 
affirmatively undertake programs favored by the Commissioner.165 In 
addition, the court believed the requirement that the program have a 
"demonstrated impact" on the prevention of certain economic costs 
guided the Commissioner's review of existing programs.166 At the same 
time, the SJC completely glossed over any meaningful discussion of ju-
dicial review or other safeguards. 167 
Similarly, in Tri-Nel Management, Inc. v. Board of Health, the SJC 
afforded substantial deference to a statewide statute that gave mu-
nicipal boards of health the power to "make reasonable health regula-
tions. "168 The plain tiffs in Tri-Nel Management, Inc. alleged a violation 
of the nondelegation doctrine after the Barnstable Board of Health 
used the authority delegated by the statute to forbid smoking "in all 
food service establishments, lounges, and bars."169 
After setting out the three Chelmsford inquiries, the SJC easily an-
swered the first, concluding that the delegating statute had not given 
local health boards the authority to formulate policy.170 The court 
then decided that the second inquiry was also satisfied because the 
requirement that any local regulation "address the 'health' of the 
community and ... be 'reasonable'" provided sufficient guidance. l7l 
In answering the third inquiry, the court largely avoided a discus-
sion of explicit safeguards. The court noted that local health boards 
had historically been given control over health concerns, and that the 
Legislature itself had dealt extensively with such matters. 172 Then the 
court surmised that such "limitations on content and reasonableness 
sufficiently demarcate the boundaries of regulatory discretion so that 
the act provides safeguards to control abuses of discretion."173 The 




167 See id. 
168 See Tri-Nel Mgmt., Inc. v. Bd. of Health, 741 N.E.2d 37, 41 (Mass. 2001). 
169 See id. at 40, 44. 
170 Id. at 44-45 (explaining that "public health matters affecting local communities 
may be the subject of reasonable municipal regulation," while adding that the Legislature 
had made similar policy determinations that prohibited smoking in other public loca-
tions) . 
171 [d. at 45. 
172 See id. 
173 See id. 
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court also mentioned briefly that the standard safeguard of declara-
tory relief remained available for those claiming that a board had ex-
ceeded "proper boundaries. "174 
III. ANALYSIS: DOES THE MASSACHUSETTS ACEC PROGRAM 
REPRESENT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION 
OF LEGISLATIVE POWER? 
Although the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) con-
tinues to insist that certain delegations of legislative power could run 
afoul of the state constitution, no delegation of legislative power has 
been struck down in Massachusetts over the past thirty years.17!i One 
could interpret those three decades of inertia as a sign that the Mas-
sachusetts nondelegation doctrine-like the federal nondelegation 
doctrine before it-has been reduced to irrelevance.176 Yet, that dra-
matic conclusion is probably premature. The remainder of this Note 
will attempt to identifY the special circumstances which might compel 
the SJC to revive the nondelegation doctrine, with particular focus on 
whether a judicial challenge to the Areas of Critical Environmental 
Concern (ACEC) program could precipitate that revival. 
A. Current Status of the Massachusetts Nondelegation Doct1ine 
A survey of Massachusetts nondelegation caselaw reveals that the 
Chelmsfo111 inquiries are the accepted "test."177 Moreover, these inquires 
seem to represent the culmination of judicial notions that had existed 
for decades,l78 Specifically, the first Chelmsford inquiry appears to em-
174 Tn-Nel Mp;mt., 741 N.E.2d at 45. 
175 Compare C & S Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. City of Westfield, 766 N.E.2d 63, 67 (Mass. 
2002) ("The principle that the General Court may not delegate the authority to make laws 
is firmly established."), with Corning Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc., 294 N.E.2d 354, 362 
(Mass. 1973) (representing the last Massachusetts decision to strike down a statute on 
nondelegation grounds). 
176 See supra text accompanying notes 45-54. 
177 In the years just after the Chelmsford inquiries were announced, there was some 
doubt as to what would be the accepted nondelegation approach. Several nondelegation 
decisions did not use the Chelmsford inquiries and applied a much stricter "test" that fo-
cused on statutory standards. See, e.g., Risk Mgmt. Found. v. Comm'r of Ins., 554 N.E.2d 
843, 848 (Mass. 1990); Dp. Justices H.R., 471 N.E.2d 1226, 1219-20 (Mass. 1984); see also 
Greco, supra note 27, at 587 tbl.l (identifying the Massachusetts nondelegation "standard" 
as having come from op. Justices H.R., 471 N.E.2d at 1226). This uncertainty appears to 
have been resolved-all of the most recent Massachusetts nondelegatioll decisions use the 
Chelmsford inquiries. See, e.g., C & S Wholesale Grocers, 766 N.E.2d at 68; Tn-Nel Mg1llt., 741 
N.E.2d at 44-45; Dps.Justices H.R., 696 N.E.2d 502, 507 (Mass. 1998). 
178 See supm text accompanying notes 77-123. 
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body the "policy or details" debate found in the Commissioner of Revenue 
v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. line of cases. 179 Conversely, the 
second and third inquires seem to encapsulate the "totality of protec-
tion against arbitrariness" goal of Town of Arlington v. Board of Concilia-
tion & ATlJitration.I80 Nevertheless, the court has not explicitly clarified 
how these three inquiries work in conjunction with each other.181 Do 
they represent a mandatory three-part test, or are they simply guide-
posts for courts to use while reviewing delegations of power? 
In short, the inquiries seem to be both. The inquiries themselves, 
as well as specific SJC decisions, support the proposition that the first 
Chelmsford inquiry represents a "threshold determination "-if a dele-
gation cannot pass first-inquiry scrutiny, the delegation fails. 182 The 
second and third inquiries appear to operate as more of a "guide"-
questions for the SJC to ponder as they attempt to determine whether 
delegated powers could be used arbitrarily.183 
B. Analyzing the Act Through the First Chelmsford Inquiry 
1. The First Inquiry: A "Threshold Determination" of 
Constitutionality 
In the years since Chelmsf01d, the SJC has not encountered a stat-
ute that delegates the power to formulate legislative policy. In other 
words, the first Chelmsford inquiry has never been answered 
affirmatively.184 Nevertheless, when confronted with a statute that does 
delegate lawmaking powers, it is conceivable that the SJC could break 
a thirty-year trend and find a violation of the nondelegation doctrine 
without having to answer the second or third inquiries.185 
179 See Chelmsford Tmilel' Park, 469 N.E.2d at 1262; supra text accompanying notes 91-
106. 
180 Sec Chelmsford Tmilcr Park, 469 N.E.2d at 1262; supm text accompanying notes 107-
123. 
181 See generally, e.g., C & S Wholesale Gmcers, 766 N.E.2d at 67-68; Chei1nsfonl Trailer Park, 
469 N.E.2d at 1262-64. 
182 See infra text accompanying notes 184-194. 
183 See infra text accompanying notes 237-250. 
184 See, e.g., C & S Wholesale Grocers, 766 N.E.2d at 68; Tri-Nel Mgmt., Inc. v. Bd. of 
Health, 741 N.E.2d 37, 45 (Mass. 2001); Ops. Justices H.R., 696 N.E.2d 502, 507 (Mass. 
1998); Op. Justices S., 660 N.E.2d 652, 659 (Mass. 1996); Powers v. Sec'y of Admin., 587 
N.E.2d 744, 749 (Mass. 1992); Constr. Indus. of Mass. v. Comm'r of Labor & Indus., 546 
N.E.2d 367, 373 (Mass. 1989). 
185 See infra text accompanying notes 186-194. 
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The most obvious basis for this conclusion comes from the literal 
language of two Chelmsf01·d inquiries. The first inquiry attempts to dis-
cover the nature of a delegation, asking whether the delegation in-
volves a "fundamental policy decision" or the "implementation of legis-
latively determined policy. "186 The second inquiry scrutinizes the 
delegating statute to see if "adequate direction for implementation" can 
be found. 1S7 
The use ofthe word "implementation" in both inquiries is telling. 
Only if the answer to the first inquiry is "no"-because the delegation 
involves implementation of policy-can the SJC answer the second in-
quiry, dealing with whether direction for such implementation is pre-
sent.tss Conversely, if the answer to the first inquiry is "yes"-because 
the Legislature delegates policymaking power-the second inquiry is 
irrelevant, because recipients of delegated powers would be making 
policy, not implementing it.189 Therefore, the first inquiry most closely 
resembles a "threshold determination. " 
There is another, more basic reason that the first inquiry looks 
like a "threshold determination." When reviewing the nature of legis-
lative delegations, the SJC has never disputed the turn-of-the-century 
notion that "[t]he General Court may not delegate the authority to 
make laws. "190 More importantly, the SJC has always equated the es-
sence of this lawmaking power with the authority to formulate sub-
stantive policy.191 For instance, in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance 
Co., the SJC opined that the ability "to enact substantive measures" 
was equivalent to "legislative authority," and could not be delegated.192 
Thus, if the lawmaking power and the authority to formulate policy 
are one and the same, then neither may be delegated.193 Since a re-
186 Chelmsford Trailer Park, 469 N.E.2d at 1262. 
187Id. 
188 See id. 
189 See id. 
190 C & S Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. City of Westfield, 766 N.E.2d 63, 67 (Mass. 2002); 
see also Tri-Nel Mgmt., Inc. v. Bd. of Health, 741 N.E.2d 37, 44 (Mass. 2001) (holding that 
". [t] he doctrine of separation of powers encompasses the general principle that the Legis-
lature cannot delegate the power to make laws'" (quoting Constr. Indus. of Mass. v. 
Comm'r of Labor & Indus., 546 N.E.2d 367, 373 (Mass. 1989»). 
191 See, e.g., Comm'r of Revenue v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 428 N.E.2d 297, 300-01 
(Mass. 1981); Brodbine v. Inhabitants of Revere, 66 N.E. 607, 609 (Mass. 1903) (making a 
distinction between "incidental" and "subsidiary" matters). 
192 See 428 N.E.2d at 30l. 
193 See C & S Wholesale Grocers, 766 N.E.2d at 67 (stating that power to make laws may 
not be delegated); Mass. Milt. Life Ins., 428 N.E.2d at 301 (equating the power to make 
laws with the power to formulate substantive policy). 
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sponse of "yes" to the first Chelmsford inquiry means that the power to 
formulate policy has been given away, it weeds out the exact type of 
delegation that the SJC has never permitted, making what appears to 
be a "threshold determination" of appropriateness. 194 
2. Plain Statutory Language: Indications That the Act Cannot Pass 
the "Threshold Determination" 
The "Act Establishing an Executive Office of Environmental M-
fairs" (the Act) delegates power to EOEA through two separate statu-
tory provisions.195 The first provision, codified in the Massachusetts 
General Laws, gives EOEA power to develop policies regarding the 
acquisition, protection, and use of ACECs.196 The second provision-
located near the end of the Act, but not codified-gives EOEA author-
ity to iden tify and designate ACECs.197 
The literal language of the first provision suggests that judicial 
review of the Act could spark a revival of the nondelegation doctrine. 
More precisely, this provision makes itself a candidate to fail the 
"threshold inquiry,"198 by stating that EOEA shall "develop statewide poli-
194 See, e.g., C & S Wholesale Grocers, 766 N.E.2d at 67; Chelmsford Trailer Park, 469 N.E.2d 
at 1262; Mass. Mitt. Life Ins., 428 N.E.2d at 301. 
195 See Act of Aug. 12, 1974, ch. 806, §§ 2(7), 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts 807, 808, 821. 
196 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21A, § 2(7) (2002) ("[EOEA] shall carry out the state envi-
ronmental policy and in so doing they shall ... develop statewide policies regarding the 
acquisition, protection, and use of areas of critical environmental concern to the com-
monwealth."). 
197 See§ 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts at 821. The assertion that the Act actually gives EOEA 
affirmative powerto designate ACECs is debatable. See id. Section 40(e) of the Act only gives 
EOEA the authority to "conduct a study relative to land use so as to identify and designate 
areas of critical environmental concern ... ." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, one could argue 
that since the Legislature only gave EOEA the power to "conduct a study," it delegated 
something less than total autonomy. See id. That conclusion is strengthened by the use of 
the term "shall" earlier in the Act when delegating powers-if the Act intended to give 
away complete control over the designation process, it probably would have followed this 
earlier language by stating that EOEA "shall" have the power to designate ACECs. See 
§ 2(7), 1974 Mass. Acts at 808. Whatever was intended, the regulations that govern the 
ACEC process make it clear that EOEA has seized the designation power as its own. See 
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 12.10 (2002) ("The [EOEA] Secretary shall make a final deci-
sion as to whether or not to designate a nominated area .... The Secretary shall designate 
an ACEC only after finding that ... the area is of critical environmental concern to the 
Commonwealth.") . 
198 See § 2(7), 1974 Mass. Acts at 808. Conversely, if the Massachusetts Legislature ad-
ministered the ACEC program itself, there would be fewer questions about the program's 
legality. Selecting individual areas of the state that are environmentally critical-and sub-
jecting those areas to increased regulation-certainly falls within the Legislature's power to 
protect the health, safety, and welfare of Massachusetts citizens. See Chebacco Liquor Mart, 
Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 711 N.E.2d 135, 138 (Mass. 1999). ("Under 
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cies regarding [ACECs] .... "199 Thus, the Legislature's own wonts indi-
cate that it intended to delegate the authority to develop statewide 
ACEC policies to EOEA, supporting the inference that the Act did not 
formulate those policies itself.20o 
Moreover, when one puts the provision in context by comparing it 
to other powers that the Act delegates to EOEA, the potential for a 
non delegation violation seems even stronger.201 Other grants of power 
in the Act deal with very specific details of larger state policies and only 
give EOEA authority to aid, promote, encourage, analyze, or monitor 
those larger activities.202 In short, those other grants of power seem to 
delegate control over the details of legislatively stated policies, while by 
comparison the ACEC provision looks and feels more like a broad 
delegation of authority to formulate substantive policy from scratch. 203 
3. Comparisons to SJC Precedent: Further Clues That the Act Cannot 
Pass the "Threshold Determination" 
A court might also conclude that the Act delegates policy-
formulating powers to EOEA because the powers delegated strongly 
resemble what the SJC has classified as "law-making powers" in other 
nondelegation decisions.204 In general, these decisions seem to sug-
gest that policy formulation, at its very core, involves the decision to 
impose burdens upon some citizens so that benefits can be bestowed 
upon other citizens.205 Put slightly differently, the essence of what 
cannot be delegated is the responsibility to balance competing interests and 
to decide whether the benefits of a proposed policy offset the costs.206 
As discussed in Part II of this Note, most SJC nondelegation deci-
sions have involved statutes that performed this balancing of benefits 
and costs themselves.207 For example, the statute in Massachusetts Mu-
the cognate provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution, legislation must bear a real and 
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some other phase of the general 
welfare. "). But, because the Legislature delegated this authority to EOEA, constitutional 
concerns and additional dangers come into play and trigger 110ndelegation scrutiny. 
199 § 2(7), 1974 Mass. Acts at 808 (emphasis added). 
200 See id. 
201 See § 2(1)-(28), 1974 Mass. Acts at 808-09. In very general terms, the Act created 
EOEA, and then listed twenty-eight powers that it possessed. Id. 
202 Seeid. § 2(4), (6), (9), (11), (14), (16), (18), (19), (22)-(24), (27). 
203 See id. 
204 See supra text accompanying notes 91-106,148-174. 
205 See infra text accompanying notes 207-217. 
206 See id. 
207 See SIIpra text accompanying notes 91-97, 148-174. 
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tual Life Insurance Co. addressed the contents of annual statements, 
which determined the amount of excise tax owed by Massachusetts 
insurance companies.208 Thus, the subject matter of the statute de-
manded a balancing of the economic benefit to Massachusetts-as the 
recipient of tax revenues-and the monetary cost imposed on state 
insurance companies paying excise taxes.209 The SJC held that the 
Legislature itself balanced those interests when it decided that insur-
ance companies should be forced to pay one percent of their annual 
gross investment income as an excise tax.210 For the court, the selec-
tion of a specific rate showed that the Legislature had placed a "ful-
crum" that balanced benefit to the state and cost to the insurance 
companies at an excise tax rate of one percent.211 
In another decision, the SJC determined that a statute had shirked 
this responsibility by delegating this critical balancing of interests to 
another entity.212 In Corning Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc. the stat-
ute dealt with the setting of "fair-trade" price floors that applied to the 
resale of certain productS.213 This practice bestowed benefits upon 
product manufacturers by helping their trademarked products main-
tain higher retail values.214 At the same time, it imposed burdens on 
consumers and retailers-in the form of higher product prices and the 
elimination of effective intra-brand price competition. 215 Implicitly, the 
SJC recognized that a balance between these interests would be struck 
by placing a "fulcrum" at the "fair-trade" price that would prevent ex-
cessive benefits or burdens from being felt by either side.216 But, since 
the statutory scheme in question gave manufacturers the right to bal-
ance these competing interests by setting the "fair-trade" price, the 
court held that the Legislature had delegated the power to formulate 
policy, thereby violating the nondelegation doctrine.217 
208 Comm'r of Revenue v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 428 N.E.2d 297, 300 (Mass. 1981). 
209 See id. at 300-01. 
210 See id. at 299 n.2, 300. 
211 See id. 
212 See Corning Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc., 294 N.E.2d 354,362 (Mass. 1973). 
m See id. at 355-56. 
214 See id. at 359. 
215 See id. at 360. 
216 See id. at 362. 
217 See id. Many other SJC nondelegation decisions mirror Massachusetts Mutual Life In-
surance Co. and Coming Glass W01*S, by supporting the notion that the "threshold determi-
nation" power to formulate policy equals the right to balance benefits and costs. Sec, e.g., 
Powers v. Sec'y of Admin., 587 N.E.2d 744, 749 (Mass. 1992) (upholding a statute that 
balances the future fiscal health of Chelsea with the costs of suspending Chelsea's demo-
cratic municipal government for at least a year); Town of Warren v. Hazardous Waste Facil-
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In light of this precedent, a court charged with reviewing the Act 
would most likely attempt to determine whether the Legislature dele-
gated the authority to balance ACEC benefits and costs to EOEA. 
Such a court might identify the protection of environmentally endan-
gered areas resulting from the designation and intense regulation of 
ACECs as a relevant benefit.218 The economic losses felt by the owners 
of ACEC-designated lands represent the pertinent costs, because 
ACEC regulations restrict possible uses of their property, and make it 
more expensive for them to develop that property.219 
Taking the next step, the reviewing court could identify two ful-
crums that are capable of balancing those interests. The first would 
control how ACECs are regulated-by placing a fulcrum at the point 
where regulations are potent enough to realize the benefit of preserv-
ing critical land, without becoming so burdensome that they strip 
land of most monetary value to its owner.220 The second would iden-
tify which lands are designated as ACECs-thereby locating a fulcrum at 
the point where environmentally critical attributes of land become so 
compelling that the burden of ACEC regulation should be placed on 
the land and its owner.221 
It is possible to conclude that the Act delegates the power to place 
both of these fulcrums to EOEA. 222 Specifically, EOEA has the authority 
to determine the content of ACEC regulations as the Act states that" 
[EOEA] ... shall ... develop statewide policies regarding the acquisi-
ity Site Safety Council, 466 N.E.2d 102, 112 (Mass. 1984) (affirming the validity of a statute 
that balances the benefit of facilitating hazardous waste facility siting with the cost of sus-
pending democratic zoning for a short time); Arno v. Alcoholic Beverages Comm'n, 384 
N.E.2d 1223, 1226-28 (Mass. 1979) (upholding a statute that balances the benefit of 
wholesome church and school environments with the costs imposed on liquor vendors 
who encounter licensing difficulties). 
218 See Act of Aug. 12, 1974, ch.806, §§ 2(7), 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts 807, 808, 821; 
DEP'T OF ENVTL. MGMT., supra note B, at 3 (describing the purpose of ACEC designation 
as "the long-term preservation, management, and stewardship of critical resources and 
ecosystems") . 
219 See §§ 2(7), 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts at 808, 821; DEP'T OF ENVTL. MGMT., supra note 
8, at 9, 15 ("Within an ACEC, potential projects are prohibited that would result in the loss 
of up to 5,000 square feet ... of Bordering Vegetated Wetland .... " ACEC regulations 
"prohibit the siting of solid waste management facilities within an ACEC. H); Noonan, Envi-
r01l1ltentai Area, supra note 6 ("Development in ACEC-covered areas are subject to stricter 
environmental reviews under the Massachusetts Environmental Protection Act."). 
220 Cf supra text accompanying notes 207-217; note 217 (discussing non delegation 
cases where fulcrums balanced benefits and costs in other contexts). 
221 Cj. supra text accompanying notes 207-217; note 217. 
222 See§§ 2(7), 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts at BOB, B2l. 
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tion, protection, and use of [ACECs] .... "223 Moreover, EOEA also has 
authority to decide which lands will be designated as ACECs.224 Section 
40(e) of the Act indicates that EOEA should "identifY and designate" 
ACECs where uncontrolled development would result in irreversible 
damage to the environment, and lists nine types of areas that might be 
included.225 More than any other provision, this one might be inter-
preted as setting a fulcrum that balances benefits to the environment 
and costs to landowners at the point where development of land would 
cause irreversible harm to environmental features. 226 
Nevertheless, a "catch-all" clause later in that same provision seems 
to militate against this conclusion.227 Specifically, the latter clause states 
that ACECs might include "such other areas as the [EOEA], after hold-
ing public hearings, may determine to be of critical environmental 
concern .... "228 Therefore, this "catch-all" clause eradicates the irre-
versible damage provision by placing the power over locating the sec-
ond fulcrum squarely in EOEA hands. 229 Simply put, it gives EOEA 
permission to ignore all the other suggestions in the provision, and de-
termine for itself which lands will become ACECs, so long as it holds a 
public hearing.230 
223 See§ 2(7), 1974 Mass. Acts at 808 (emphasis added). 
224 See§ 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts at 821. 
225 Id. This provision also points to a section of the Massachusetts Code that defines 
"irreversible damage to the environment." Id.; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30, § 61 (2002) 
(defining "irreversible damage to the environment"). 
226 See§ 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts at 821; cJ. supra text accompanying notes 207-217; note 
217 (discussing nondelegation cases where fulcrums balanced benefits and costs in other 
contexts). 
227 See§ 40(e) (10),1974 Mass. Acts at 821. 
228 Id. 
229 See id. By way of comparison, if the Act had stated that 5% of all Massachusetts lands 
should be considered environmentally critical, an actual fulcrum would have been placed. 
The Legislature would have made the determination that only 5%of Massachusetts land is 
environmentally critical enough to justify ACEC regulation. The determination of which 
lands belong in that 5% could then be delegated to EOEA, as a detail of this larger policy. 
See infra text accompanying notes 238-249 (discussing nondelegation cases where fulcrums 
balanced benefits and costs in other contexts); cf Askewv. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 
913,915 (Fla. 1979) (describing a Florida program nearly identical to the Massachusetts 
ACEC program, but containing a provision that prohibited the program from "designating 
more than five percent ... of the land within the state ... as an area of critical state con-
cern."). 
230 See§ 40(e)(1O), 1974 Mass. Acts at 821. In fact, evidence suggests that EOEA does 
use this "catch-all" clause to largely circumvent the Act, by designating ACECs through a 
complex procedure that it has designed itself. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, §§ 12.01-.12 
(2002). Specifically, EOEA allows "any ten citizens" of Massachusetts to identify and nomi-
nate lands that they think are worthy of ACEC designation, reflecting permissiveness that 
is not contemplated by the Act. Compare id. § 12.05(1), with §§ 2(7), 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts 
136 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 31:103 
In sum, any court reviewing the Act could conclude that the Act 
bears more resemblance to the statute in Corning Glass Works, where 
policy formation was delegated, than the statute in Massachusetts Mu-
tual Life Insurance Co., where the statute made that determination for 
itself. 231 Specifically, the determination of how to regulate ACECs, and 
the decision of which lands to designate as ACECs, represent the ful-
crums in the ACEC situation.232 It would appear that the Act gives 
both of these powers to EOEA, much like the statute in Corning Glass 
Works gave the power to set a "fair-trade" price to manufacturers.233 
Moreover, unlike the statute in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 
where a specific tax rate of one percent was set, the Act does not seem 
to specifically provide any fulcrums. 234 
Ultimately, the Act might embody the special type of circumstance 
that would compel the SJC to revive the nondelegation doctrine. The 
court could use the plain language of the Act and comparisons to SJC 
precedent to decide that the power to balance competing interests in 
the ACEC context is delegated to EOEA.235 Based on that conclusion 
alone, the court could answer "yes" to the first Chelmsford inquiry, and 
hold that the ACEC program was unconstitutional from its inception 
because the Act impermissibly delegated legislative authority. 236 
at 808, 821. Moreover, although the eleven criteria for ACEC eligibility bear some resem-
blance to the "suggestions" from the Act, when the actual decision to designate or not 
designate an area is made, the EOEA Secretary uses criteria that have no solid basis in the 
Act itself. Compare MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, §§ 12.06, 12.09, with §§ 2(7), 40(e), 1974 
Mass. Acts at 808, 821. It would appear that EOEA justifies this wide latitude by requiring 
itself to hold public hearings, thereby placing the activities under the "catch-all" clause of 
the Act's section 40(e). Compare § 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts at 821, with MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 
301, § 12.08 ("Before designating an area, the [EOEA] Secretary shall hold a public hear-
ing."). 
231 Compare §§ 2(7), 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts at 808, 821, with Comm'r of Revenue v. 
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 428 N.E.2d 297, 299 n.2, 300-01 (Mass. 1981), and Corning Glass 
Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc., 294 N.E.2d 354,362 (Mass. 1973). 
232 See supra text accompanying notes 220-221. 
233 See§§ 2(7), 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts at 808,821; cf Corning Glass Works, 294 N.E.2d at 
362. 
234 See §§ 2(7), 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts at 808, 821; cf Mass. Mut. Life Ins., 428 N.E.2d at 
299 n.2, 300-01. 
235 See supra text accompanying notes 195-230. 
236 See supra text accompanying notes 185-194. 
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C. Analyzing the Act Through the Second and Third Chelmsford Inquiries 
1. The Second and Third Inquiries: "Guides" That Help Determine 
Whether Delegations Protect Against Arbitrariness 
In the years since Chelmsford Trailer Park, the SJC has not encoun-
tered a set of facts that has compelled it to find a violation of the non-
delegation doctrine through use of the second and third Chelmsford 
inquiries.237 Nevertheless, even when a delegation survives "threshold 
inquiry" scrutiny, it still must pass some type of second- and third-inquiry 
scrutiny. 238 
Although the SJC has never said so, these second and third inquir-
ies do not appear to represent rigid requirements, but rather seem 
more like "guides" that the SJC uses to help alleviate larger nondelega-
tion concerns. Evidencing this flexibility, Massachusetts nondelegation 
decisions have never found second-inquiry standards to be lacking, be-
cause the SJC has: (1) substituted "general guides" for actual standards; 
(2) inferred standards from the overall purpose of a statute; and (3) 
borrowed standards from other statutes dealing with similar subject 
matter. 239 
Moreover, when answering the third inquiry, the SJC has occa-
sionally overlooked a lack of explicit safeguards.240 For instance, ex-
plicit standards were never mentioned in Blue Cross oj Massachusetts, 
Inc. v. Commissioner oj Insurance, but a delegation was nonetheless de-
clared constitutional because general guides prevented the recipient 
of delegated power from enjoying "unfettered discretion."241 Almost 
identically, the SJC did not find explicit safeguards in Tri-Nel Manage-
ment, Inc. v. Board oj Health, but stated that "[iJn regard to the third 
consideration limitations on content and reasonableness 
237 See supra text accompanying notes 146-174. 
238 See Chelmsford Trailer Park, Inc. v. Town of Chelmsford, 469 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 
(Mass. 1984). 
239 See, e.g., C & S Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. City of Westfield, 766 N.E.2d 63, 68 (Mass. 
2002) (borrowing standards from other tax statutes); Tri-Nel Mgmt., Inc. v. Bd. of Health, 
741 N.E.2d 37, 45 (Mass. 2001) (discussing why general guides could replace more explicit 
standards); Ops.Justices H.R., 696 N.E.2d 502, 507 (Mass. 1998) (stating that a delegation 
can be guided by reference to other statutes); Op. Justices S., 660 N.E.2d 652, 658-59 
(Mass. 1996) (inferring standards from a statute's purpose); Chelmsford Trailer Park, 469 
N.E.2d at 1262-64 (inferring standards from a statute's purpose and borrowing standards 
from other statutes). 
240 See Tn-Nel Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d at 45; Blue Cross of Mass., Inc. v. Comm'r ofIns., 489 
N.E.2d 1249, 1256 (Mass. 1986). 
241 See Blue Cross of Mass., 489 N.E.2d at 1256. 
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sufficiently demarcate the boundaries of regulatory discretion so that 
the act provides safeguards to control abuses of discretion. "242 
These patterns lead to the conclusion that the SJC does not insist 
upon a rigid application of the second and third ChelmsfoTd inquiries. 
More precisely, since the SJC has found second-inquiry standards in 
almost any situation-by using general guides, inferred standards, or 
borrowed standards-it is probable that future delegations will not 
automatically fail simply for a lack of explicit standards.243 Moreover, 
because the SJC has occasionally accepted delegations lacking explicit 
third-inquiry safeguards, future delegations without explicit safe-
guards are unlikely to be summarily declared unconstitutiona1.244 
Thus, the question remains what would compel the SJC to conclude 
that a delegation fails second- and third-inquiry scrutiny? 
In all likelihood, the SJC would use the second and third inquir-
ies to revive the nondelegation doctrine only if the challenged delega-
tion did not contain a mixture of standards and safeguards sufficient 
to prevent delegated powers from being used arbitrarily. Some com-
mentators offer support for this proposition by suggesting that a focus 
on preventing arbitrariness is the nondelegation "trend" at the state 
level, because many state judiciaries "uphold[] broad delegations 
when procedures and safeguards are in place to guard against the ar-
bitrary exercise of ... power."245 More importantly, there are clues 
that the SJC has been influenced by this "trend." In pre-ChelmsfoTd 
precedent that dealt with standards and safeguards, the SJC focused 
intently upon the "'totality of the protection against arbitrariness' 
provided in the statutory scheme. "246 The Chelmsfonl decision itself 
expressed a desire to protect citizens from "arbitrary" actions.247 In 
addition, even after the formal articulation of the Chelmsford inquiries, 
242 See id. (emphasis added). 
243 See supm text accompanying note 239. 
244 See Tri-Nel Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d at 45; Blue Cross of Mass., 489 N.E.2d at 1256. 
245 Greco, supra note 27, at n.65 (citing FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
73-91 (1965); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 2.04 (2d ed. 1978); 
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 1982 SUPPLEMENT TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 3.14 
(1982». But see Rossi, supra note 27, at 1189 (suggesting that the "trend" towards protect-
ing against arbitrariness picked up steam in the 1960s and 1970s, but stalled thereafter). 
246 Town of Arlington v. Bd. of Conciliation & Arbitration, 352 N.E.2d 914, 920 (Mass. 
1976) (quoting KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 2.00-5 (Supp. 
1970». 
247 Chelmsford Trailer Park, Inc. v. Town of Chelmsford, 469 N .E.2d 1259, 1264 (Mass. 
1984). 
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the SJC has at times remained wary of the "arbitrary exercise of 
authority" in delegation situations.248 
Perhaps most importan tly, the ChelmsjoTd inquiries would still 
function coherently if the second and third inquiries actually served 
as interrelated "guides" that strive towards protecting against arbi-
trariness. Specifically, the first ChelmsjoTd inquiry could be thought of 
as a filter-getting rid of delegations that are clearly impermissible 
because they give away the very essence of legislative power.249 The 
second and third ChelmsjoTd inquiries, on the other hand, would be 
more like complementary "guides" that comb delegations of power 
passing through the initial filter for other defects-like a lack of stan-
dards or a lack of safeguards-that could lead to arbitrary results.250 
2. Do Standards and Safeguards in the Act Work Together to Protect 
Against Arbitrariness? 
Thus, in order for judicial review of the Act to precipitate a non-
delegation doctrine resurgence using the second and third inquiries, a 
search for standards and safeguards in the Act would have to yield an 
overall mixture of the two which fails to protect against arbitrariness. 
Given the SJC's willingness to conduct a broad search for second-
inquiry standards, it is extremely likely that a reviewing court would 
248 Constr. Indus. of Mass. v. Comm'r of Labor & Indus., 546 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Mass. 
1989). 
249 See supra text accompanying notes 184-194. 
250 See Chelmsford Trailer Park, 469 N.E.2d at 1262; supra text accompanying notes 239-
248. Putting these ideas together with those from supra text accompanying notes 184-194, 
this Note suggests that the Chelmsford inquiries be revised to reflect the current status of 
the doctrine. This revised test would state that: 
In order to determine whether a delegation of legislative au thority is "proper," Massa-
chusetts courts undergo a two-part analysis. First, the courts make a threshold determina-
tion of constitutionality--does a delegation give away the power to make fundamental 
policy decisions? See Chelmsford Trailer Park, 469 N.E.2d at 1262. If so, the statute violates 
the non delegation doctrine. See genemlly mpra text accompanying notes 184-194. 
If the answer to this threshold determination is no, because only implementation of 
an already-stated policy is delegated, the courts move on to the second half of the analysis. 
Specifically, the courts evaluate whether there is overall protection against arbitrariness 
within a delegation of power. See generally supra text accompanying notes 239-248. To make 
this determination, courts may consider: (1) whether a delegation provides statutory stan-
dards, or other guidance, to direct the implementation of policy; and (2) whether a dele-
gation provides for safeguards that prevent potential abuses of discretion by recipients of 
power. See Chelmsford Tmiler Pa/*, 469 N.E.2d at 1262. If the courts find that a delegation 
does not protect against arbitrariness, the statute violates the nondelegation doctrine. See 
ge1lerally supra text accompanying notes 239-248. 
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find some level of statutory standards in the Act.251 More specifically, 
standards to govern the content of ACEC regulations could be gleaned 
from a plausible purpose of the Act, which is to "protect" ACECs from 
"irreversible damage. "252 Moreover, standards to govern ACEC designa-
tion could take the form of nine "suggestions" that the Act offers, list-
ing critical land attributes that might trigger ACEC designation.253 
However, a court might have more trouble finding explicit safe-
guards in the Act. In decisions where the SJC has easily found safe-
guards, there were usually mechanisms put in place by a statute that 
allowed the Legislature to closely monitor delegated powers.254 As an 
example, in Powers v. Secretary oj Administration the SJC found such 
mechanisms because that recipient was required to submit an annual 
report to the Legislature, and because the recipient was only ap-
pointed to a one-year term that could be ended at any time.255 In the 
ACEC context, a court might find that the Act imposes restraints on 
EOEA. In a general sense, it is true that the EOEA Secretary serves at 
the pleasure of the Governor, that EOEA is required to prepare an 
annual report of its activities, and that EOEA regulations and deci-
sions are subject to administrative review. 256 
Conversely, a court could also be skeptical that these safeguards 
actually prevent ACEe-related abuses of discretion. The ACEC program 
represents but a fraction of EOEA's activities, and the lack of safe-
guards specifically drafted to regulate the ACEC program could pre-
clude the monitoring of delegated powers to the extent possible in 
Powers.257 For example, the Act does not require EOEA to file a report 
with the Legislature when an ACEC designation is made, nor does it 
provide an affirmative mechanism for the Legislature to monitor 
ACEC decisions, nor does it provide a special judicial remedy for 
those who feel aggrieved by EOEA's ACEC decisions.258 At the very 
least, the presence of safeguards in the Act seems debatable. 
251 See supra note 239. 
252 See Act of Aug. 12, 1974, ch. 806, §§ 2(7), 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts 807, 808, 821. 
253 See§ 40(e) (1)-(9),1974 Mass. Acts at 821. 
25. See, e.g., Powers v. Sec'y of Admin., 587 N.E.2d 744, 750 (Mass. 1992). 
255 See id. Another safeguard was the fact that the recipient of power was under the di-
rect supervision of the Secretary of Administration. See id. 
256 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21A, §§ I, 3 (2002); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30A, §§ 2, 
5 (2002) (dealing with the passage of admin istrative regulations) . 
257 See§§ 2(7), 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts at 808, 821; Powers, 587 N.E.2d at 750. 
258 See id. Of course, general administrative safeguards restrict EOEA. See MAS!>. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 30A, §§ 2, 5 (2002). In the ACEC context, however, where EOEA drafts all regu-
lations itself, one might ask if administrative safeguards really restrain discretion. See id; 
§§ 2(7), 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts at 808,821. 
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In order to predict whether a court would find this mix of stan-
dards and safeguards to be sufficient, it is helpful to compare the Act 
to situations where the SJC has evaluated delegations with similarly 
questionable safeguards. Any reviewing court would find it important 
that the SJC has found protection against arbitrariness in such in-
stances when meaningful limits were placed on how recipients could 
utilize delegated powers.259 For example, in Blue Cross of Massachusetts, 
Inc. the SJC found that a delegation of power to the Commissioner of 
Insurance was acceptable, even though the statute lacked formal safe-
guards.260 The delegated power in question was the Commissioner's 
authority to approve insurance rate increases after finding that certain 
programs utilized by insurance companies were "acceptable to 
him. "261 The court seemed to believe that meaningful limits were 
placed on the Commissioner's power because he could only review 
company programs and suggest alternatives-and could not force com-
panies to initiate one program or another.262 
Likewise, in T1i-Nel Management, Inc. the SJC found meaningful 
limits placed upon delegated powers, even though no formal safe-
guards were present.263 There, a local board of health had been dele-
gated the power to adopt "reasonable health regulations," and had 
used that power to ban smoking in all local restaurants. 264 The court 
concluded that the local Board of Health could only pass regulations 
having to do with the health of the community, and any regulation it 
passed would have to be reasonable.265 Perhaps more importantly, the 
SJC was comforted by the fact that local boards had a long history of 
regulating local health matters, and that the Legislature itself had ex-
tensively dealt with statewide health matters.266 The court seemed 
confident that this long tradition of health regulation placed a mean-
ingful limit on the type of regulation that the local Board could im-
pose.267 
259 See infra text accompanying notes 260-267. 
260 Blue Cross of Mass., Inc. v. Comm'r of Ins., 489 N.E.2d 1249, 1256 (Mass. 1986) 
(stating that a delegation did not give the recipien t of power "unfettered discretion"). 
261 ld. at 1255 n.12. 
262 See id. at 1256 (noting that the Commissioner had "restricted his discretion in hold-
ing that' [i] t is beyond the scope of my statutory authority to dictate exactly what ... pro-
grams should be undertaken ... .'"). 
263 Sec Tri-Nel Mgmt., Inc. v. Bd. of Health, 741 N.E.2d 37, 45 (Mass. 2001). 
264 See id. at 41. 
265 See id. at 45. 
266 See id. 
26i See id. 
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In the ACEC context, it is not as easy for a court to conclude that 
the Act places meaningful limits on what EOEA is able to do with its 
delegated authority. It is probably true that EOEA is somewhat re-
strained when it determines the content of ACEC regulations. A court 
could find that those regulations would have to be reasonable, and 
that the long tradition of state environmental statutes and regulations 
provide a model for the type of ACEC regulation that is permissi-
ble.268 These limits seem similar to those found in Tri-Nel Management, 
Inc., because reason and regulatory precedent restrain the recipient 
of power.269 
Notwithstanding these observations, the Act's delegation of 
power to designate ACECs is probably different. In both Blue Cross of 
Massachusetts, Inc. and Tri-Nel Management, Inc., meaningful limits 
meant that the recipient of delegated powers could not do certain 
things.27o By comparison, EOEA has far more discretion than the re-
cipients of power in Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc. and T1i-Nel Man-
agement, Inc. Specifically, EOEA is not limited to the "review" power 
found in Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., because the agency has the 
affirmative power to decide for itself which areas will become ACEC-
designated. 271 Moreover, though presumably limited by reason, EOEA 
is not limited by the regulatory tradition found in T1i-Nel Management, 
Inc., because state environmental laws-both before and after the 
Act-have never addressed anything quite like the ACEC designation 
power possessed by EOEA.272 
In addition, a court might also find EOEA's wide-ranging latitude 
to designate ACECs troubling. The Act places few restraints on the 
process that EOEA can use to designate ACECs, puts no limit on the 
amount of state land that EOEA can designate as an ACEC, and voices 
no opinion on how frequently EOEA should designate ACECs.273 
These realizations could be enough to justify a conclusion that the 
non delegation doctrine should be mobilized to strike down the Act, 
268 Cf Tn-Nel Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d at 45 (finding meaningful limits because board regula-
tions would have to be reasonable and could be compared to prior statutes). 
269 Cornpare Act of Aug. 12, 1974, ch. 806, § 2(7), 1974 Mass. Acts 807, 808, with Tri-Nel 
Mgt/It., 741 N.E.2d at 45. 
270 See Tn-Nel Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d at 45; Blue Cross of Mass., Inc. v. Comm'r of Ins., 489 
N.E.2d 1249, 1256 (Mass. 1986). 
271 See§ 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts at 821; Bllle Cross of Mass., 489 N.E.2d at 1256. 
272 See§ 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts at 821; Tli-Nel Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d at 45. 
273 See§ 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts at 821; see also MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, §§ 12.02-.12 
(2002) (setting out ACEC designation procedures). 
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because its mixture of standards and safeguards does not protect 
against arbitrariness.274 
3. The ACEC Program in Practice: Evidence of Arbitrary ACEC 
Designations 
Even if a court remained convinced that the Act's mixture of 
standards and safeguards protect against arbitrariness on their face, 
the real-life example of what EOEA has done with the ACEC program 
could persuade otherwise. Put another way, where there is smoke, 
there is usually fire-if a court were persuaded that ACEC designa-
tions are arbitrary in practice, it could logically conclude that the Act 
does not protect against arbitrariness. 
In fact, an alert court might detect arbitrariness from a thorough 
examination of areas that have been designated as ACECs in the years 
since the program began.275 Although there are now ACECs in sev-
enty-five Massachusetts cities and towns, covering almost a quarter of a 
million acres, it is arguable that some of the more environmentally 
critical areas of the state are not ACECs.276 For example, Nantucket 
and Martha's Vineyard-the largest islands in the state-have not 
been designated as ACECs.277 In addition, the Quabbin Reservoir-
one of the largest man-made reservoirs in the world-has not been 
designated as an ACEC.278 Arguably, a rational program would 
designate these three areas as ACECs, based on the underlying notion 
that ACECs are meant to be areas "where unique clusters of natural 
and human resources exist and which are worthy of a high level of con-
cern and protection. "279 Thus, a court might observe that ACEC des-
ignations do not strictly correspond to all areas in the state that have 
critical environmental attributes, raising the possibility that the selec-
tion of ACECs is somehow arbitrary. 
274 See supra text accompanying notes 239-248. 
275 See DEP'T OF ENVTL. MGMT., supra note 8, at 16-18. 
276 See id. (listing land in the ACEC program before the December 2002 designation); 
Noonan, EnvimnmentalArea, supra note 6 (detailing the amount of lands and a list of towns 
that were affected by the December 2002 designation). 
277 See DEP'T OF ENVTL. MGMT., sttpra note 8, at 16-18. 
278 See id.; see also MASS. WATER RES. AUTJI., QUABBIN RESERVOIR AND WARE RIVER, at 
http://www.mwra.state.ma.us/04water/html/hist5.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003) (stat-
ing that the Quabbin Reservoir supplies the metropolitan Boston area with water, and that 
the 412 billion gallon waterbody is the largest man-made reservoir in the world devoted 
solely to water supply). 
279 MASS. REGs. CODE tit. 301, § 12.03 (2002). 
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Digging deeper, a court might find an explanation for such arbi-
trariness from the process that is used to designate ACECs.280 Although 
the EOEA Secretary makes final designation decisions, an area must be 
nominated before it can be designated. Therefore, nominators are re-
sponsible for selecting potential ACECs from all possible state lands. 281 
Though any number of public officials can nominate land for ACEC 
consideration, it is also true that any ten Massachusetts citizens may do 
SO.282 Further, in order for these nominators to prove that land is eligi-
ble for ACEC consideration, they must only show that the parcel in 
question contains vague environmental "features" from four out of 
eleven groups crafted by EOEA's ACEC regulations.283 As an example 
of how easy it is for land to become eligible, a court could note that a 
hypothetical tract of land would be eligible for ACEC nomination if it 
merely contained: (1) a wet meadow; (2) a stream; (3) land of agricul-
tural productivity; and (4) a natural area. 284 With the bar for ACEC eli-
280 See generally MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, §§ 12.01-.16 (2002) (describing the ACEC 
nomination and designation process). 
281 See id. §§ 12.03, .05-.07, .10. 
282 See id. § 12.05(1)(a)-(d). 
283 See id. § 12.06. In full, the nomination criteria state that: 
To be eligible for nomination, an area shall contain features from four or more 
of the following groups: (1) Fishery Habitat-anadromous/ catadromous fish 
runs, fish spawning areas, fish nursery areas, or shellfish beds; (2) Coastal Fea-
tures-barrier beach system, beach, rocky intertidal shore, or dune; (3) Estua-
rine Wetlands-embayment, estuary, salt pond, salt marsh, or beach; (4) Inland 
Wetlands-freshwater wetlands, marsh, flat, wet meadow, or swamp; (5) Inland 
Surface Waters-lake, pond, river, stream, creek, or ox bow; (6) Water Supply 
Areas-floodplain, erosion area, or unstable geologic area; (7) Natural Hazard 
Areas-floodplain, erosion area, or unstable geologic area; (8) Agricultural 
Area-land of agricultural productivity, forestry land, or aquaculture site; (9) 
Historical/Archaeological Resources-buildings, site, or district of historical, 
archaeological, or paleontological significance; (10) Habitat Resources-habi-
tat for threatened or endangered plant or animal species, habitat for species of 
special concern, or other significant wildlife habitat; and (11) Special Use Ar-
eas-undeveloped or natural areas, public recreational areas, or significant sce-
nic site. 
Id. Thus, so long as an area contains one feature from four out of these eleven groups, it can 
be nominated for ACEC consideration. See id. 
284 See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 12.06(4)-(5), (8), (11); see also Letter from David 
E. Tully, concerned resident, to Robert Durand, EOEA Secretary 1 (Sept. 27, 2002) (on 
file with author) ("Under the 'ACEC Nomination Guidelines,' there can hardly be any 
parcel on land within any of the communities affected [by the December 2002 designa-
tion] that do not meet the criteria .... "). In fact, though this Note does not address the 
issue, a court might find these regulations to be so vague that they are unconstitutional 
under the "void for vagueness" doctrine. Compare MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 12.06, with 
Daddario v. Cape Cod Comm'n, 780 N.E.2d 124, 130 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (finding that a 
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gibility set so low, it is entirely possible that ten Massachusetts citizens 
could arbitrarily nominate areas that hold special meaning to them, 
even if those lands were not objectively critical to the rest of the state.285 
In addition, with suburban sprawl becoming an increasing concern in 
Massachusetts, it is possible that citizen-nominators might be motivated 
more by a desire to halt development in their town than by concern for 
the environment when nominating ACECs.286 
Even if the nomination process were perfect, a court might still 
be concerned by the ease with which the EOEA Secretary can accept 
nominations, and designate an area as an ACEC. First, a public hear-
ing is required, though there is nothing to prevent an EOEA Secre-
tary from ignoring opposition to nominations.287 In fact, an attendee 
at one such hearing made the following observation after the Decem-
ber 2002 ACEC designation: 
I'm sure it has come as no surprise to anyone who sat through 
the ... ACEC hearings that [EOEA] Secretary Robert Durand 
has approved these designations .... If I thought this issue was 
going to receive a fair review, I was sadly mistaken. Instead, I 
sat listening to countless ACEC supporters extolling the vir-
tues of Mr. Durand and vice versa, each insisting that the 
other had done so much more to further the cause. In con-
trast, Mr. Durand sat in quiet conversation with an associate 
statute could be void for vagueness if it is "so vague that 'men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,' thereby allowing 
'untrammeled [administrative) discretion' ... and arbitrary and capricious decisions ... ." 
(quoting Bd. of Appeals v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 294 N.E.2d 393, 411-12 (Mass. 1973»). 
285 See Noonan, Environmental Area, supra note 5 (noting that ACEC opponents believe 
the December 2002 nomination to have been "spearheaded by a handful of supporters" 
who belong to various pro-environment groups); Letter from David E. Tully, concerned 
resident, to Robert Durand, EOEA Secretary 2 (Oct. 7, 2002) (on file with author) ("Look-
ing at the average person promoting the [ACEC) nomination/designation, what does this 
person have to lose? Absolutely nothing, his/her property values [do) not change dra-
matically, while the person owning the land pays the taxes, [and) carries the burden of 
ownership while some[onel else enjoys the scenic benefits."). Contra Noonan, EnviTOn-
mental Area, supra note 5 (quoting ACEC proponents as saying that more than ten nomi-
nating signatures were gathered in every town affected by the December 2002 nomina-
tion). 
286 See Benjamin Krass, Note, Combating Urban Sprawl in Massachusetts: Reforming the Zon-
ing Act ThTOugh Legal Challenges, 30 B.C. ENVTI. AFF. L. REV. 605, 606 (2003); see also Letter 
from David E. Tully, concerned resident, to Robert Durand, EOEA Secretary 2 (Oct. 7, 
2002) (on file with author) (raising the possibility that the ACEC nominators might have 
been motivated by a desire to slow land development in the area). 
287 See MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 12.08 (2002). 
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while an opponent to these designations voiced his con-
cerns.288 
Mter the public hearing, the EOEA Secretary must consider nine fac-
tors in deciding whether to designate nominated lands as an ACEC, 
though the "strong presence of even a single factor may be sufficient 
for designation .... "289 Thus, in order to designate an ACEC, the 
EOEA Secretary is only required to hold a public hearing and con-
clude that one compelling reason for designation is present.290 A re-
viewing court might also note that the EOEA Secretary has no incen-
tive to seriously consider rejecting an ACEC nomination, because 
neither the Act, nor ACEC regulations, places a cap on the total 
amount of land in the state that can be designated as an ACEC.291 
Thus, in looking at the real-life administration of the ACEC pro-
gram, one could observe that current ACECs do not necessarily repre-
sent the most critical environmental areas in the state.292 It is also possi-
ble that the designation process encourages that arbitrary result by 
permitting as few as ten citizens-whatever their motivation-to nomi-
nate land.293 The conclusion that the EOEA Secretary is not forced to 
correct this arbitrariness would also be justified, because only a low 
level of review is required before designation, and because there is rela-
tively little incentive for EOEA to reject nominations.294 In sum, a court 
could reach the conclusion that the overall ACEC designation process 
is characterized by a degree of arbitrariness. 
288 Simmons, supra note 13. There is also evidence that several citizens sent Durand 
letters asking him to exclude land from the nomination that did not appear to meet the 
eligibility threshold-something that Durand ultimately chose not to do. See, e.g., Letter 
from Lee Anne Gunderson, concerned citizen, to Robert Durand, EOEA Secretary 2 
(Sept. 16, 2002) (on file with author) (comparing the nomination criteria to her land and 
stating, "[a)s you can see, our property contains one or debatably two features at the most. 
For this reason alone, our property should never have been included [in the ACEC nomi-
nation)."); Letter from Richard R. Smith, concerned landowner, to Robert Durand, EOEA 
Secretary 1 (Aug. 23, 2002) (on file with authm) (requesting that his land be excluded 
from the ACEC nomination because "the criteria for nomination, para. 12.06 (1), (2), (3), 
(5), (6), (7), (9), and (11) do not apply to [my) land"). 
289 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 12.09. 
290 See id. §§ 12.08-.09. EOEA must also make written findings concerning the deci-
sion, and make them available to the public pursuant to state administrative rules. See id. 
§ 12.11(1). 
291 See Act of Aug. 12, 1974, ch.806, §§ 2(7), 40(e), 1974 Mass. Acts 807, 808, 821; 
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, §§ 12.00-.16. 
292 See supra text accompanying notes 276-279. 
293 See supra text accompanying notes 280-286. 
294 See supra text accompanying notes 287-291. 
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Thus, it seems possible that a court charged with reviewing the 
Act could conclude that the ACEC program presents exactly the risk 
of arbitrariness that the second and third Chelmsford inquiries were 
designed to prevent. The lack of explicit safeguards in the statute it-
self, the absence of meaningful limits placed on EOEA's power, and 
the arbitrary administration of the real-life ACEC program supports 
this assertion.295 On these bases, a court might very well conclude that 
the Act fails second- and third-inquiry scrutiny, and therefore violates 
the Massachusetts nondelegation doctrine.296 
CONCLUSION 
Without question, delegations of legislative power are necessary 
to make government work. It is simply unrealistic to believe that legis-
latures can effectively react to our complex and ever-changing society 
with statutes that address every minute detail across an infinite spec-
trum of policy situations. Thus, allowing delegations of legislative 
power is often appropriate and efficient. Yet, these delegations can 
only be so broad-federal and state nondelegation doctrines draw 
lines in the sand that legislative delegations cannot cross. In Massa-
chusetts, one might be tempted to conclude that this line in the sand 
no longer exists, since the nondelegation doctrine has not been used 
to invalidate a statute in thirty years. Nevertheless, this Note has ar-
gued that the nondelegation doctrine could enjoy a resurgence if the 
judiciary were confronted with particular types of delegations. 
More specifically, this Note has fleshed out the current status of 
the Massachusetts nondelegation doctrine, in an effort to determine 
what sort of delegation might compel the SJC to revitalize the doc-
trine. Generally speaking, delegations of legislative power in Massa-
chusetts must survive the framework of scrutiny set out by the SJC in 
Chelmsford Trailer Park, Inc. v. Town of Chelmsfo1Yl. This framework con-
sists of three "inquiries" that the SJC uses to structure its nondelega-
tion analysis. Although the SJC has historically given challenged stat-
utes considerable deference when engaging in these inquiries, it 
seems likely that the inquiries could be mobilized to invalidate future 
delegations in two specific situations. First, it is possible that the SJC 
could someday use the first Chelmsford inquiry as a "threshold deter-
mination" to invalidate a delegation of power that gives away the basic 
responsibility to balance the benefits and costs of a legislative policy. 
295 See supra text accompanying notes 251-294. 
296 See supra text accompanying notes 238-250. 
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In the alternate, it seems equally possible that the SJC could use the 
second and third Chelmsford inquiries to invalidate a statutory delega-
tion where the overall mixture of standards and safeguards poses an 
unacceptable societal risk, because it does not sufficiently protect 
against arbitrary actions by recipients of power. 
This Note has also postulated that the legislative enactment giv-
ing rise to the ACEC program might represent the type of delegation 
that could spark a revival of the nondelegation doctrine. In 1974, 
when Massachusetts legislators drafted the Act, they delegated broad 
power to administer the ACEC program to EOEA. As matters stand in 
2003, EOEA oversees an ACEC program that regulates nearly a quar-
ter of a million acres across seventy-five Massachusetts municipalities, 
and in some instances, places land-use and development restriction 
on the vast majority of all land in a particular community. 
Should the ACEC delegation be challenged in a Massachusetts 
court, it would be a candidate for invalidation. First and foremost, it is 
far from certain that the Act can pass the "threshold determination" 
represented by the first Chelmsford inquiry. More precisely, a court 
could easily conclude that the Act gives EOEA the power to balance 
societal benefits and costs-as represented by the power to craft 
ACEC regulations, and by the untrammeled authority to determine 
which state lands should become ACEC-designated. Moreover, it is 
also unclear that the Act contains a mixture of standards and safe-
guards sufficient to survive second- and third-inquiry scrutiny in a 
ChelmsfoTd analysis. Especially in the designation process, the risk of 
arbitrariness seems great, because the Act lacks explicit safeguards, 
the power delegated to EOEA is not meaningfully limited, and the 
real-life ACEC program is plagued by arbitrariness. 
In all probability, the demise of the Massachusetts non delegation 
doctrine has been greatly exaggerated. Despite the reluctance of the 
judiciary to strike down statutes using this doctrine over the past thirty 
years, there are certain types of delegations that could precipitate a 
rebirth of the doctrine. Unless the Massachusetts Legislature revamps 
the ACEC program in an effort to take some power back from 
EOEA,297 the statute giving birth to that program will remain a candi-
date to lead such a resurrection. 
297 For an example of how the Massachusetts Legislature could revamp the ACEC pro-
gram to insulate it from attack, see supra note 229. 
